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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Introduction 
This proceeding is procedurally unique in that it is an interlocutory appeal from the denial 
of summary judgment. In the current case, Plaintiffs state claims for negligence against 
Defendants related to the sale and installation of a ProFORM Pulsation Control System 
("ProFORM System"). The system was negligently designed, installed and maintained in such a 
manner that it was defective and unreasonably dangerous. As a result of its defective condition, 
the ProFORM System did not operate properly and caused identifiable physical injury to 
Plaintiffs' dairy cows. As a result of this injury, the dairy cows produced less milk and produced 
lower quality milk, directly resulting in lost profits to Plaintiffs. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs 
have not demonstrated injury to their dairy cows, that Plaintiffs' damages are therefore purely 
economic in nature and are therefore barred by the "economic loss rule" in Idaho. 
Plaintiffs have offered ample evidence of physical injury to their dairy cows. Indeed, the 
district court noted this evidence, and properly viewing the facts in a light most favorable to 
Plaintiffs, found that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment 
regarding Plaintiffs' claim that their dairy cows have been injured. Defendants repeatedly invite 
this Court to second guess the district court's factual findings. These factual findings are not 
properly within the scope of this Court's review on interlocutory appeal. Defendants also ask the 
Court to expand the existing "economic loss rule" by way of the current interlocutory appeal. As 
demonstrated below, the expansion proposed by Defendants runs contrary to existing law and 
public policy concerns and must be rejected. 
After denying Defendants motion for summary judgment, the district court expressed 
willingness to consider certifying interlocutory appeal. Plaintiffs opposed interlocutory appeal 
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because, in addition to arguing that the economic loss rule facially does not bar their claims, 
Plaintiffs had pled that there is a "special relationship" between the parties. · This special 
relationship exception is a separate exception to the economic loss rule standing alone. Plaintiffs 
argued that because there were factual issues in the record regarding the existence of a special 
relationship, interlocutory appeal would not help efficiently dispose of the current case and was 
therefore inappropriate. Despite these factual issues, the district court summarily found that there 
was no evidence of a special relationship and entered judgment in favor of Defendants on this 
issue. See Tr., Vol. I, 72:24-73:2. Plaintiffs were the only party to present any evidence 
regarding the special relationship exception to the district court. Therefore, Defendants failed to 
meet their burden of showing the lack of genuine issues of material fact and the district court's 
grant of summary judgment on the special relationship issue constitutes error. 
Additionally, Defendant U. S. Dairy never filed a summary judgment motion regarding 
the economic loss rule or the special relationship exception. Instead, at the summary judgment 
hearing on January 25, 2008, U. S. Dairy simply made an oral motion for summary judgment on 
the same bases and facts as set forth by Westfalia. Therefore, U. S. Dairy never set forth specific 
facts relevant to U. S. Dairy which would arguably entitle it to summary judgment. Moreover, 
U. S. Dairy failed to follow proper procedures for summary judgment motions, and as a result, 
Plaintiffs did not have the opportunity to respond to U. S. Dairy's arguments in support of 
summary judgment. Plaintiffs therefore cross-appealed from the court's entry of summary 
judgment in favor ofU. S. Dairy on the special relationship issue. See R., Vol. I, pp. 185-189. 
B. Course of Proceedings in the District Court 
Plaintiffs filed its initial Complaint in this case against Defendants for negligence, breach 
of contract, breach of warranty, equitable estoppel and attorney fees. See R., Vol. I, pp. 26-34. 
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Plaintiffs subsequently amended their Complaint, alleging an additional claim for negligent 
design. See R., Vol. I, pp. 60-61. 
Defendant Freedom Electric, Inc. ("Freedom") moved for summary judgment on 
November 21, 2007. See R., Vol. I, pp. 82-95. Westfalia joined in Freedom's motion for 
summary judgment and later filed its own motion for summary judgment on December 21, 2007. 
See R., Vol. I, pp. 96-98; pp. 99-104, respectively. U.S. Dairy also filed a motion for summary 
judgment regarding Plaintiffs' contract claims. See R., Vol. I, pp. 105-113. On January 4, 2008, 
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their breach of contract and breach of warranty claims. See R., 
Vol. I, pp. 129-131. Plaintiffs also filed a motion to amend to add a claim for punitive damages 
against Westfalia. See R., Vol. I, pp. 132-134. All of the above motions were heard by the 
district court on January 25, 2008. See Tr., Vol. I, pp. 1-86. At the hearing and without briefing 
the issue, U.S. Dairy requested permission to join in Westfalia's motions for summary judgment 
based upon the economic loss rule. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 70. Over Plaintiffs' objections, the court 
permitted U.S. Dairy to join Westfalia's motion. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 73. 
The district court denied Defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding that 
Plaintiffs had stated claims for damages to property, and there were sufficient issues of fact to 
preclude summary judgment. See R. Vol. I, pp. 175-177. The district court then enten:,d an order 
approving interlocutory appeal by permission. See R., Vol. I, pp. 159-163. This Court granted 
Defendants' motion for permission to appeal the district court's denial of Defendants' summary 
judgment motions. See R. Vol. I, pp. 164-165. Defendants filed an initial notice of appeal and 
an amended notice of appeal on May 1, 2008. (See R., Vol. I, pp. 166-171, 178-184), and 
Plaintiffs filed a notice of cross-appeal on May 2, 2008. See R., Vol. I, pp. 185-189. 
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C. Statement of Facts 
Plaintiffs are owner-operators of the Double A Dairy located in the Twin Falls area. 
Defendant Westfalia is controlled by a European conglomerate known as GEA. See R. Vol. I, p. 
193, Exhibits, Whitehead Aff., 1/4/08 (Exhibit B to Aff., Foster Dep. 7:7-12). Westfalia is one 
of the largest manufacturers of milking equipment components in the world. The ProFORM 
Pulsation Control System ("ProFORM System") is manufactured by Westfalia. The specialized 
equipment components of this pulsation system are complex, have specified electrical wiring 
requirements, and can only be installed by dealers trained and certified by W estfalia. Defendant 
U.S. Dairy is the sole authorized and certified dealer representative for Westfalia in Idaho. 
Plaintiffs purchased several million dollars of ProFORM System milking equipment components 
for their Double A Dairy. 
The ProFORM System was designed in the 1970's and was intended to accommodate 
dairies with smaller milking parlors. See R. Vol. I, p. 193, Exhibits, Whitehead Aff., 1/4/08 
(Exhibit B to Aff., Foster Dep. at 18:21-20:1). While the smaller parlors contain double 10 or 12 
configurations for milking, the modem Double A Dairy has double 50 configurations in each of 
its four parlors/pits. (A double 12 contains 24 milking stalls while a double 50 has 100 milking 
stalls.) A complex system of pulsators control milking in this system. Each pulsator contains two 
coils. Rather than containing 48 coils per parlor (as would be the case with a double 12), the 
double 50 has 200 coils per parlor. This means substantially increased electrical loads on the 
milking system. All Westfalia did to adjust to modem dairy size needs was to essentially 
quadruple the number of pulsators that were controlled by the coils. Unfortunately for Plaintiffs 
and the dairy industry, this resulted in electrically overextending the pulsation system and caused 
the pulsators to malfunction. See R., Vol. I, p. 193, Exhibits, Neubauer Aff. 5, 1/4/08. The 
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result of the malfunction was damage to the cows and decreased milk production. Westfalia did 
not test its overextended system to determine whether it would function properly without 
damaging cows. See R. Vol. I, p. 193, Exhibits, Whitehead Aff., 1/4/08 (Exhibit A to Aff., 
Snyder Dep. 20: 15-19). 
The ProFORM System purchased by Plaintiffs for the Double A Dairy was negligently 
designed, constructed and installed by Westfalia and/or U. S. Dairy. See R., Vol. I, pp. 60-61, 
1125-34. Each individual pulsator that makes up part of the pulsation control system contains 
two coils that, when energized, create an electric magnetic effect that causes a metal plunger to 
activate. When de-energized the plunger falls. This process alternatively allows vacuum or 
atmosphere into the pulsation system that in tum operates to milk the cow. See R., Vol. I, p. 193, 
Exhibits, Neubauer Aff. 3, 1/4/08. When Westfalia overextended its milking equipment system 
to attempt to accommodate a modem dairy such as Double A, it caused the pulsators to 
malfunction. Id. at 4-5. This in turn caused physical injury to the cows. Contrary to the 
statements of Defendants, Plaintiffs specifically pied that the malfunctioning equipment was 
"causing damage to Plaintiffs' dairy cows due to poor and/or inadequate wiring designed and/or 
installed by defendants." See R., Vol. I, p. 59, 124; see also R., Vol. I, p. 60-61, 1127, 30-31. 
W estfalia representatives conceded that malfunctioning pulsators cause physic~! injury to 
dairy cows. One such witness was Jeffrey Snyder who was in charge of coordinating training for 
Westfalia dealers regarding the ProFORM System. See R. Vol. I, p. 193, Exhibits, Whitehead 
Aff., 1/4/08 (Exhibit A to Aff, Snyder Dep. 17:7-15). Another Westfalia representative was Earl 
Patterson, a co-defendant and the Westfalia ProFORMance Sales Specialist for W estfalia. See 
R., Vol. I, p. 193, Exhibits, Whitehead Aff., 1/4/08 (Exhibit C to Aff., Patterson Dep. 17:4-17). 
Patterson "went through quite a bit of training" when he joined Westfalia to learn the "technical 
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aspects" of what he was selling. Id. at 16:24-17:3. Snyder and Patterson left no doubt that 
malfunctioning pulsators injure cows: 
• Milk letdown occurs m conjunction with the letdown hormone known as 
oxytocin. See R., Vol. I, p. 193, Exhibits, Whitehead Aff., 1/4/08 (Exhibit A to 
Aff., Snyder Dep. 27:22-28:5). When inadequate milk letdown occurs "you don't 
get the full level of oxytocin, the letdown hormone, so the cow holds her -- her 
milk and [it] is not released for harvest." Id. It is essential that the dairy cow be 
properly milked out to prevent inadequate milk letdown. 
• The pulsation system must work correctly in order "to properly milk the cow." 
See R., Vol. I, p. 193, Exhibits, Whitehead Aff., 1/4/08 (Exhibit A to Aff., Snyder 
Dep. 25:12-18). "[PJroper pulsation is required to milk the cow without injuring 
her." Id. at 30:2-15. An improperly functioning pulsation system can "injure the 
... cow's teats or udder" which leads to increased somatic cell counts and reduced 
production. Id. at 26:1-23, 27:10~20. The ProFORM Pulsation system is direct 
acting with a piston arrangement which is supposed to have a ratio of milking and 
rest to relieve milk from the cow without injuring her. See R., Vol. I, p. 193, 
Exhibits, Whitehead Aff., 1/4/08 (Exhibit C to Aff., Patterson Dep. 2~:20-24:5). 
If the ratio is too aggressive and "you're trying to remove the milk too quickly" 
the cow can be damaged by "a breakdown of the teat canal, of the tissue thereof" 
Id. at 24:6-19. 
• Clinical evidence of injury to cows from improperly functioning milking 
equipment includes increased somatic cell count, increased mastitis and decreased 
milk production. See R., Vol. I, p. 193, Exhibits, Whitehead Af£, 1/4/08 (Exhibit 
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C to Aff., Patterson Dep. 25:18-26:21). Increased somatic cell count appearing in 
milk tests results in lower quality milk and reduced prices. 
Larry Neubauer is one of Plaintiffs' experts and is a licensed Master Electrician. He has 
investigated over I 000 dairy farms for electrical issues affecting dairy cows. See R., Vol. I, p. 
193, Exhibits, Neubauer Aff., 1/4/08 (Exhibit A to Aff., Report of Lawrence C. Neubauer, p. I). 
Mr. Neubauer investigated the Westfalia milking equipment at Double A Dairy. He concluded 
the pulsators malfunctioned and damaged the dairy cows as evidenced by increased somatic cell 
count, decreased production and decreased quality of milk. See R., Vol. I, p. 193, Exhibits, 
Neubauer Aff., 1/4/08 (Exhibit A to Aff., Report of Lawrence C. Neubauer, p. 9-10). Plaintiffs 
also have engaged two veterinarians who have rendered opinions that the cows have suffered 
injuries from the malfunctioning pulsators. 
Michael Behr, Ph.D., an agricultural economist, has rendered his opinion regarding the 
damages flowing from the injured cows as manifested by increased somatic cell counts, 
decreased quality and decreased quantity of milk. See R., Vol. I, p. 193, Exhibits, Behr Aff., 
1/4/08 (Exhibit A to Aff., Report of Michael Behr, Ph.D., at p. 3). "Capital Loss" to the herd 
alone amounts to $450 per head x 14,450 cows or $6,502,500. Id. at p. 63. It is little wonder 
that Plaintiffs' damages are so large given the enormous size of the dairy herd. In Mike Vierstra 
and Susan Vierstra, dlbla Vierstra Dairy v. Idaho Power Company (District Court of the Fifth 
Judicial District, State ofidaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, Case No. CV 00-3408), the 
jury returned an actual damages verdict in excess of $6.6 million for the same type of losses 
claimed at bar. See Appendix, Special Verdict, Vierstra v. Idaho Power. In Vierstra, the herd 
size was less than 1500 cows, a factor of at least nine times less than the Double A herd. Given 
the increased milk prices and the size of the dairy herd, actual damages of $34 million are 
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verifiable. 
At the hearing on January 25, 2008, the lower court announced its ruling denying 
Westfalia's motion for summary judgment, which motion was based upon the economic loss rule 
and stated in part as follows: 
So I don't think there's any question in this record as to the fact that the plaintiffs 
have alleged that their cattle were injured by the property [milking equipment] 
which was the subject of the transaction; ... 
In this case, there clearly was no calamitous event; but there was, in this 
court's view, a dangerous failure of the product.. .. I note and I have read, in terms 
of preparing for the motion relative to punitive damages, that agents of the 
defendants had noted the injuries that may occur to the cattle themselves as a 
result of defective products .... 
With that said, then, I conclude that the damages here are noneconomic, 
sufficient, and parasitic to the injury to the cattle to allow this case to proceed to 
trial. 
See Tr., Vol. I, 51:16-20, 52:18-53:10; 54:3-6. 
Defendants conceded the following facts relevant to the issue of a "special relationship": 
1. Before dealers are allowed to install the ProFORM System they must be certified by 
Westfalia. See R., Vol. I, p. 193, Exhibits, Whitehead Aff., 1/4/08 (Exhibit A to Aff., Snyder 
Dep. 75:1-76:9). Recertification occurs every five years. Id. at 78:3°9. 
2. Westfalia knows more about its own equipment than the dairy farmer does and in fact 
has "superior knowledge" to that of the dairy farmer. See R., Vol. I, p. 193, Exhibits, Whitehead 
Aff., 1/4/08 (Exhibit C to Aff., Patterson Dep. 67:2-16). 
3. Westfalia has superior knowledge to that of the dairy farmer regarding the design of its 
own milking equipment system. See R., Vol. I, p. 193, Exhibits, Whitehead Aff., 1/4/08 (Exhibit 
D to Aff., Schuring Dep. 22:1-5, 9-13, 16). 
The above evidence presented by Plaintiffs went unrefuted. U. S. Dairy, Westfalia's 
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authorized dealer, failed to present any evidence that there was not a special relationship between 
it and Double A Dairy. In fact, U. S. Dairy never complied with any of the procedural 
requirements for summary judgment on this issue. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Defendants set forth the incorrect standard of review in their brief. Defendants' proposed 
standard of review would be proper if the current appeal was not an interlocutory appeal; for 
instance if the current appeal was taken from a final grant of summary judgment. In such 
circumstances, the appellate court uses the same standard for reviewing a district court's decision 
on summary judgment. A party is entitled to summary judgment if "there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 
56( c ). In determining a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe all facts in a light 
most favorable to the non-moving party and make all appropriate inferences in favor of the non-
moving party. Pratt v. State Tax Commission, 128 Idaho 883, 920 P.2d 400 (1996). 
The current appeal is taken from the "unusual posture" of interlocutory appeal from a 
district court's denial of summary judgment. Winn v. Frasher, 116 Idaho 500, 501, 777 P.2d 722 
(1989). As a result, the scope and standard of the Court's review is different from a review of a 
final order on summary judgment. Plaintiffs address issues regarding the scope and standard of 
review in more detail in later sections in this brief. (See Infra Section N.A.2.). The standard of 
review on an interlocutory appeal is limited. The Court must accept the facts assumed by the 
district court when denying summary judgment and determine only the pure legal issues properly 
before the court. See Winn, 116 Idaho at 501, 777 P.2d 722 ("Because of the unusual posture of 
the case, we are constrained to rule narrowly and address only the precise question that was 
framed by the motion and answered by the trial court."). 
RESPONDENTS' /CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 9 
III. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Does this Court have jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal to review the district court's 
factual findings, including its finding that, viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, 
Plaintiffs have stated a claim for injury or damage to their property and resultant parasitic 
economic loss? 
2. Should this Court affirmatively expand Idaho's "economic loss rule" to preclude 
recovery in tort if the product sold causes damage to other property which may "foreseeably" 
interact with the product sold? 
3. Whether the district court erred in finding there is no evidence of a special relationship 
between Plaintiffs and Defendants? 
4. Whether the district court erred in granting Defendant. U.S. Dairy's motion for 
summary judgment on the issue of a special relationship without receiving any briefing and 
without U.S. Dairy providing a statement of relevant facts on the issue? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Economic Loss Rule Does Not Bar the Recovery of Plaintiffs' Damages 
in the Current Case. 
1. Plaintiffs May Recover Economic Losses that are "Parasitic" to any 
Injury to Property Other than the Subject of the Transaction. 
Under Idaho law, "unless an exception applies, the economic loss rule prohibits recovery 
of purely economic losses in a negligence action because there is no duty to prevent economic 
loss to another." Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300, 108 P.3d 996 (2004) 
(citing Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass 'n., 126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 895 P.2d 1195 (1995)); 
Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 41, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987); Clark v. International 
Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 336, 581 P.2d 784 (1978). The origin of the economic loss rule 
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generally is traced to Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal.Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965), in which 
the court denied the plaintiff recovery of lost profits allegedly resulting from the failure of a 
defective truck. The Seely court stated the following with respect to economic losses recoverable 
in tort: 
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical injuries 
and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the 
'luck' of one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical injury. The 
distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a 
manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products. He can appropriately be 
held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods to match 
a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks 
of harm. He cannot be held for the level of performance of his products in the 
customer's business unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet the 
consumer's demands. A consumer should not be charged at the will of the 
manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on 
the market. He can, however, be fairly charged with the risk that the product will 
not match his economic expectations unless the manufacturer agrees that it will. 
Even in actions for negligence, a manufacturer's liability is limited to damages for 
physical injuries and there is no recovery for economic loss alone. 
45 Cal. Rptr. at 23, 403 P .2d at 151. Based on this reasoning, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted 
the economic loss rule in 1974. Clark, 99 Idaho at 334-35, 581 P.2d 784 (quoting Seely, 45 Cal. 
Rptr. at 23,403 P.2d at 151). 
Consistent with the reasoning in Seely, Idaho law has always recognized as an exception 
to the economic loss rule that "economic loss is recoverable in tort as a loss parasitic to an 
injury to person or property." Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d 1195 (emphasis added) 
(citing Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., Inc., 99 Idaho 462, 468, 583 P.2d 997 (1978); See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766C cmt. b ("If there is physical harm to the person or land or 
chattels of the plaintiff, ... there may be recovery for negligence that results in physical harm .... 
When recovery is allowed, the loss of expected profits or other pecuniary loss may, in an 
appropriate case, be recovered as 'parasitic' compensatory damages"). Idaho courts have defined 
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"economic loss" to include "costs of repair and replacement of defective property which is the 
subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss of inadequate value and consequent loss of 
profits or use," and have defined "property damage" to encompass "damage to property other 
than that which is the subject of the transaction." Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 351, 544 P.2d 306 (1975) (emphasis added); Clark, 99 Idaho 
at 332, 581 P.2d 784. Therefore, the question is whether Plaintiffs have suffered damage to 
property other than that which is the subject of the transaction as defined by Idaho law. 
Idaho law is clear: economic losses may be recoverable in tort if a defectively dangerous 
product causes injury to property other than that which is the subject of the transaction and the 
economic loss is parasitic to that injury. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1195. 
Defendants would like to change this clear rule, and seek to do so by way of the current 
interlocutory appeal. In doing so, Defendants ask this Court to resolve numerous issues which 
are not appropriate for interlocutory review. In this case, the trial court correctly found that 
Plaintiffs have pied and the record demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiffs' 
economic losses are parasitic to injury or damage to Plaintiffs' property, and therefore 
remediable in tort. This finding is founded upon substantial facts in the record. Therefore, it 
must be accepted by the Court and cannot be reviewed in the context of an interlocutory appeal. 
2. Defendants Improperly Ask the Court to Review the Factual Record 
and Findings of the District Court. 
Appeal from interlocutory orders is allowed in Idaho when the appeal "involves a 
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and 
in which an immediate appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly 
resolution of the litigation." I.A.R. 12(a). Rule 12 implements a similar set of procedures and 
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principles governing interlocutory appeal as its federal counterpart, 28. U.S.C. 1292(b). Budell v. 
Todd, 105 Idaho 2, 3, 665 P.2d 701 (1983). Federal authority is therefore instructive on how 
I.AR. 12(a) should be interpreted and applied. 
On interlocutory appeal, the Court is only permitted to detennine "controlling questions 
of law." I.AR. 12(a); Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 118 Idaho 147, 149, 795 P.2d 309 
(1990). To insure that courts only examine controlling questions of law on interlocutory appeal, 
the reviewing court must accept the factual findings as set forth by the district court. Amundsen 
v. Jones, 533 F.3d 1192, 1199 n. 3 (10th Cir. 2008), Barella v. City of Philadelphia, 501 F.3d 
134, 136 n. 2 (3rd Cir. 2007), Valdes v. Crosby, 450 F.3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir. 2006). 
Therefore, this Court must accept the district court's findings of the facts and pleadings as 
viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs (the non-moving party) and only answer pure 
legal questions based upon the factual findings set forth by the district court. 
In this case, Plaintiffs' damages consist both of loss or damage to property, injury to 
Plaintiffs' herd of dairy cows, and damages parasitic to that injury in the form of lost milk 
production. Contrary to the statements of Defendants, Plaintiffs specifically pied that the 
malfunctioning equipment was "causing damages to Plaintiffs' dairy cows due to poor and/or 
inadequate wiring designed and/or installed by defendants." See R., Vol. I, pp. 59-61, ,r,r 24, 27, 
30-31. Representatives of Westfalia, Jeffrey Snyder and Earl Patterson, both admitted during 
their depositions that malfunctioning pulsators will cause injury to dairy cows. Snyder testified 
that a malfunctioning pulsation system can injure the cow's teats or udders. See R., Vol. I, p. 
193, Exhibits, Whitehead Aff., 1/4/08 (Exhibit A to Aff., Snyder Dep. 26:8-10, 17-23). If the 
pulsation system is not working properly, Patterson testified that the milking equipment in 
essence is attempting to remove the milk too quickly and in tum causes damage to the cow by 
RESPONDENTS'ICROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF-13 
causing "a breakdown of the teat canal, and the tissue thereof." See R., Vol. I, p. 193, Exhibits, 
Whitehead Aff., 1/4/08 (Exhibit C to Aff., Patterson Dep. 24:6-19). This results in an increase in 
the condition of mastitis in the dairy cows, and increased somatic cell count, which decreases the 
quality of the milk produced. Eventually, the injured dairy cows suffer also from decreased milk 
production as a result of the injury. Representatives of both Plaintiffs and Defendants, as well as 
veterinary doctors engaged by Plaintiffs, have testified that the defective pulsators would in fact 
cause physical injury to the dairy cows. 
Based on this factual record, the district court correctly found that Plaintiffs' claims are 
not precluded by the economic loss rule and denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
Consistent with the pleadings and the facts revealed in discovery, the district court held that 
Plaintiffs have alleged their dairy cows were injured by the defective milking equipment, and 
held that thls injury is a result of a dangerous failure of the milking equipment. Importantly, the 
court noted the admissions by Mr. Snyder and Mr. Patterson that a malfunctioning pulsation 
system would cause injury to Plaintiffs' dairy cows. Properly viewed in a light most favorable to 
Plaintiffs, the district court held that there is at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Plaintiffs' dairy cows have suffered physical injury and whether Plaintiffs' economic losses are 
parasitic to such injury. The district court held that, as pied by Plaintiffs, this injury is specific 
property damage and the economic losses due to reduced quality and quantity of milk is parasitic 
to that property damage. See Tr., Vol. I, 54:3-6. This is the established factual basis upon which 
the current appeal must rest. 
In contravention of proper procedure for an interlocutory appeal, Defendants repeatedly 
invite this Court to reexamine factual findings and to weigh facts in the record in conjunction 
with the current appeal. Contrary to the district court's determination of the facts in the record 
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viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Defendants repeatedly argue that Plaintiffs did not 
state a claim for damage to property sufficient to support an award of parasitic economic losses. 
For instance, Defendants specifically argue that the report of Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Michael Behr, 
"conclusively demonstrates that all of the damages sought by the [Plaintiffs] are nothing more 
than economic losses" and that "[t]here is no expression of a claim for property damage." (App. 
Br. 16). This argument is directly contrary to the district court's findings of the facts viewed in a 
light most favorable to Plaintiffs. To resolve this question would require this Court to reexamine 
the record in the district court and reevaluate the factual foundation upon which this appeal is 
based. 
This Court may not pursue such a broad scope of review on interlocutory appeal. With 
respect to the scope of interlocutory review, one court stated the following: 
[interlocutory appeals are] intended, and should be reserved, for situations in 
which the [reviewing court] can rule on a pure, controlling question of law 
without having to delve beyond the surface of the record in order to determine the 
facts. The antithesis of a proper [interlocutory] appeal is one that turns on 
whether there is a genuine issue of fact or whether the district court properly 
applied settled law to the facts or evidence of a particular case .... The legal 
question must be stated at a high enough level of abstraction to lift the question 
out of the details of the evidence or facts of a particular case and give it general 
relevance to other cases in the same area oflaw. 
McFarlin v. Conseco Services, LLC, 381 F.3d 1251, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004). As the United States 
Supreme Court put it more succinctly, "a question of 'evidence sufficiency,' i.e., which facts a 
party may, or may not, be able to prove at trial" is not answerable on interlocutory appeal. 
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304,313 (1995). 
The restraint exhibited by this Court in Winn v. Frasher, 116 Idaho 500, 777 P.2d 722 
(1989), reflects the proper limited scope of interlocutory appeal. In Winn, the Court recognized 
that a denial of a motion for summary judgment, the same type of order appealed from in this 
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case, is generally not reviewable on interlocutory appeal. 116 Idaho at 50 I, 777 P.2d 722. The 
Court, however, permitted review but limited the scope of review to answering the abstract legal 
question posed. As the Court stated, "[b ]ecause of the unusual posture of the case, we are 
constrained to rule narrowly and address only the precise question that was framed by the motion 
and answered by the trial court." Id. The Court therefore answered the abstract legal question 
presented, but refused to engage in a review of the trial court's factual findings or to apply their 
ruling on the abstract legal question to the facts as presented by the trial court's findings. Id. 
As demonstrated by Defendants' "Issues Presented on Appeal," Defendants would have 
this Court engage in essentially an unlimited review of the district court's decision in this case. 
Defendants list the following issues for review by this Court: 
A. Whether the district court erred in holding that the economic loss rule did 
not bar Respondents' tort claims. 
*** 
C. Whether the economic loss rule bars recovery in tort when all of the 
alleged damages are economic losses and there no [sic] losses claimed for 
damage to other property. 
D. Whether there is any evidence of special circumstances or special 
relationship exempting Respondents from application of the economic loss 
rule. 
(App. Br. 8-9). These issues simply cannot be decided without a reexamination oCthe record 
and an in depth review of the district court's factual findings. In fact, Issue C assumes facts that 
"all of the alleged damages are economic losses and there are no losses claimed for damage to 
other property," which are directly contrary to the factual findings made by the district 
court. These factual arguments do not reflect the district court's determination of the facts 
viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, and they contradict the district court's findings, 
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which serve as the factual basis upon which this appeal is taken. 
The only issue that is sufficiently legal and does not encompass factual issues and 
findings is the issue of"[ w ]hether the economic loss rule bars recovery in tort for losses arising 
from commercial transactions when there is damage to other property, the possibility of which 
should have been foreseen and made a subject of the transaction if the purchaser wanted to be 
protected from the risk of such damage and its consequences." (App. Br. 8). As is required by 
I.A.R. 12(a), however, there is no "substantial grounds for difference of opinion" as to the law in 
Idaho regarding this issue. There has been a long-standing exception to the economic loss rule in 
Idaho for economic losses parasitic to particular injury to property. Idaho law is settled in this 
area. Defendants, however, attempt to inject controversy into the settled law by citing opinions 
from other jurisdictions. This does not demonstrate a difference of opinion sufficient to support 
interlocutory appeal. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat'! Energy Policy Devel. Grp., 233 F. Supp. 
2d 16 (D.D.C. 2002)("A litigant cannot create a 'substantial ground for difference of opinion' 
justifying interlocutory appeal simply by arguing for a particular interpretation or extension of 
existing law."). Idaho law is clear, and the current interlocutory appeal is not an appropriate 
vehicle to actively expand the economic loss rule. 
The Court must exercise restraint and limit its review to those issues which are 
appropriate for interlocutory appeal. Factual issues and a review of the district court's factual 
findings are not appropriate for an interlocutory appeal. Moreover, interlocutory appeal is not an 
appropriate means for seeking expansion or reversal of existing law. None of the issues 
presented by Defendants constitute "a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial 
grounds for difference of opinion" as required under I.A.R. 12(a). Therefore, the Court should 
not engage in active reformation of existing established law and should remand the current case 
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to the district court for trial. 
3. Plaintiffs' Losses are Parasitic to Particular Injury to Plaintiffs' Herd 
and are Recoverable Under Idaho Law. 
As the district court found in this case, viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the 
losses claimed by Plaintiffs are parasitic to an identifiable injury to property. As demonstrated 
above, the district court's finding is not properly reviewable within the current interlocutory 
appeal. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs will demonstrate that they have pied a specific injury to their 
dairy cows and parasitic economic loss for which Idaho tort law provides a remedy. 
In this case, Plaintiff Double A Dairy contracted to purchase electrical milking equipment 
to be used in its dairy operations. There should be no question that the Plaintiffs' herd of dairy 
cows constitute "property other than that which is the subject of the transaction" under Idaho law. 
Indeed, Defendants do not actually argue in their brief that the herd is not property other than that 
which is the subject of the transaction between the parties. This is not an "integrated system" 
case in which a component part causes damage to an integrated system (Salmon Rivers, 97 Idaho 
348, 544 P.2d 306); nor is this a case in which a defect in a product used in construction of a 
building or a home causes damage to the building as a whole (Blahd, 141 Idaho 296, 108 P.3d 
996). Therefore, there is no real issue that the Plaintiffs' dairy cows constitute "other property," 
and the milking equipment is the property which is the subject of the transaction. - The real 
question is whether the dairy cows have been injured or damaged and whether Plaintiffs' 
economic loss is parasitic to such injury or damage. As demonstrated below, both questions 
must be answered in the affirmative, and as such, Plaintiffs may recover their economic losses. 
As discussed in detail in the previous section, Plaintiffs' damages consist both of loss or 
damage to property, injury to Plaintiffs' herd of dairy cows, and damages parasitic to that injury 
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in the form of lost milk production. The economic loss rule does not preclude Plaintiffs from 
recovering damages for lost production which is parasitic to an injury to their dairy cows. Duffin, 
126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d 1195. Defendants argue, however, that the injury to Plaintiffs' dairy 
cows is not an injury to "other property," but is rather related to Plaintiffs' disappointed 
expectations regarding the performance of the milking equipment. Again, as discussed 
previously, it is inappropriate for the Court in the current proceeding to engage in the 
reexamination of the pleadings, record and factual findings of the trial court necessary to answer 
this question. 
Notwithstanding this fact, it is apparent that Defendants' arguments plainly misrepresent 
the character of Plaintiffs' claims in this case. As the record demonstrates, Plaintiffs have not 
only pied a specific physical injury to their dairy cows, but the facts in discovery demonstrate that 
Plaintiffs' dairy cows were in fact injured by the milking equipment that was manufactured, sold 
and maintained by the Defendants in a defective condition such that it was unreasonably 
dangerous to Plaintiffs' property. Such an injury constitutes "property damage" under Idaho law, 
and Plaintiffs may therefore recover damages parasitic to such injury. 
First, contrary to the statements of Defendants, Plaintiffs specifically pied that the 
malfunctioning equipment was "causing damages to Plaintiffs' dairy cows due to poor and/or 
inadequate wiring designed and/or installed by defendants." See R. Vol. I, pp. 59-61, ,r,r 24, 27, 
30-31). Representatives of Westfalia, Jeffrey Snyder and Earl Patterson, both admitted during 
their depositions that malfunctioning pulsators will cause injury to dairy cows, including causing 
a breakdown of the teat canal and tissue. In addition, veterinary doctors engaged by Plaintiffs 
have testified that the defective pulsators would in fact cause physical injury to the dairy cows. 
This injury results in an increase in the condition of mastitis in the dairy cows, and increased 
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somatic cell count, which decreases the quality of the milk produced. Eventually, the injured 
dairy cows also suffer from decreased milk production as a result of the injury. 
Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs' claims for damage to the dairy cows are not in the 
form of property damage are plainly inaccurate. Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Behr provided opinions 
regarding Plaintiffs' damages in this case. Dr. Behr places the Plaintiffs' losses into three main 
categories: (1) reduced milk production, (2) loss of price premiums from reduced milk quality, 
and (3) loss of dairy capital. See R., Vol. I, p. 193, Exhibits, Behr Aff., 1/4/08 (Exhibit A to Aff., 
Report by Michael Behr, Ph.D. at p. 3). As to capital loss, Dr. Behr states that "[t]he value of the 
herd is below normal because of its reduced milk production." In an amount of $450 per cow, or 
$6,502,500. See R., Vol. I, p. 193, Exhibits, Behr Aff., 1/4/08 (Exhibit A to Aff., Report by 
Michael Behr, Ph.D., at p. 63). Although this loss in value may be related to the loss in 
productivity of the cows over time, this loss is separate and apart from Plaintiffs' claims for lost 
profits or lost milk production. This capital loss represents a loss in value of the cows as a result 
of the injury caused by the defective milking equipment. This injury constitutes damage to 
property other than that which is the subject of the transaction. 
Defendants also erroneously argue that this physical injury is merely a result of a failure 
of the milking equipment to meet commercial expectations. Defendants argue, therefore, that 
this injury is not cognizable in tort, but is instead subject only to remedies in contract. In support 
of this argument, Defendants cite language in Myers in which the Court found that the plaintiff 
did not allege property damage because the plaintiffs alleged damages "did not result from a 
calamitous event or dangerous failure of the product," but instead "arose from the failure of the 
product to match the buyers' commercial expectations." 114 Idaho at 437, 757 P.2d 695. 
As previously discussed, based on the factual record the district court dismissed 
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Defendants arguments and held that Plaintiffs have in fact alleged their dairy cows were injured 
by the defective milking equipment. Relying on the above quoted language in Myers, the district 
court held that this injury is a result of a dangerous failure of the milking equipment. The district 
court held that this injury to the cows is specific noneconomic property damage and the loss in 
milk production is parasitic to that property damage. This holding is not reviewable on 
interlocutory appeal, and Defendants arguments that this finding was incorrect are futile. 
Moreover, this holding properly draws the line between property damage and parasitic loss, 
which is recoverable in tort, and expectancy damages which are relegated to contract remedies. 
The distinctions between Myers and the current case demonstrate why the injury to 
Plaintiffs' dairy herd is "property damage" sounding in tort and not contract. In Myers, the 
plaintiff stated numerous claims, including negligence and strict products liability, related to 
alleged defects in a feed storage and delivery silo used in the plaintiffs' dairy operations. The 
plaintiff in Myers claimed that the defective feed storage and delivery silo caused reduced quality 
in the feed which caused a decline in milk production of the herd. Essentially, in Myers, the 
Court held that the plaintiffs claims related to the failure of the product to do what it was 
purchased to do: properly store feed for the dairy herd. This failure, the Court held, was related 
to the commercial expectations of the plaintiff and not a legal duty owed by the defendant to 
consumers to assure that the defendant's products will not cause damage to person or property. 
By contrast, in the current case, Plaintiffs' claims do not arise merely out of the failure of 
the milking equipment to do what Plaintiffs purchased the equipment to do. Instead, Plaintiffs' 
claims arise from a specific injury to the herd caused by the dangerous defect in the milking 
equipment. This injury manifested as physical damage caused by the equipment and 
recognizable injury to the udders and tissue of the dairy cows. As a result of and parasitic to 
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this physical injury, the productivity of Plaintiffs' dairy cows and the quality of the milk 
· produced markedly decreased. 
Importantly, the district court specifically noted these distinctions in denying Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment. As the district court stated: 
So I don't think there's any question in this record as to the fact that the plaintiffs 
have alleged that their cattle were injured by the property which was the subject of 
the transaction; and the reason I distinguish this case from both the federal case, 
De Vries and Myers, frankly, is that I don't believe in any of those cases - and 
perhaps the federal case is not directly that way - but in Myers and the cases cited 
in Myers, they all involve feed issues, where feed damaged production of milk and 
where that milk production, being damaged, therefore, caused a loss. 
(Tr. 51:16-52:4). This Court simply cannot reexamine the district court's application of Myers 
to the facts of the current case within an interlocutory appeal and Defendants arguments that 
Plaintiffs' claims should fail under Myers are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. 
Moreover, the district court's holding is substantively consistent with. general principles 
of product liability law. As a general matter, "[ o ]ne who sells any product in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability 
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property .... " 
Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 402A(l) (1965). A claim for such damages sounds in tort, not 
contract. Under Idaho law, economic losses parasitic to such physical harm caused to the 
consumer's property are recoverable. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d 1195. The language 
of Myers relating to a "calamitous event or dangerous failure of the product" simply reflects the 
fact that, for a plaintiffs claims for economic losses to be based in tort, there must be physical 
harm caused to the plaintiffs property that is the result of an unreasonably dangerous condition 
of the product. Plaintiffs have overcome this threshold, as demonstrated above, by showing that 
the milking equipment physically harmed their herd. 
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Finally, Defendants cite De Vries v. De Laval, Inc., 2006 WL 1582179 (D. Idaho 2006), in 
support of their general argument that Plaintiffs' claims are precluded by the economic loss rule. 
De Vries appears to arise out of similar circumstances as are present in the current case, and it is 
therefore intriguing at first blush. In truth, however, De Vries is not helpful to the necessary 
analysis in the current appeal. First, De Vries is an unpublished opinion from a federal magistrate 
judge, and therefore carries little precedential value. Moreover, the opinion provides no insight 
as to what facts the record contained regarding the plaintiffs' claims for injury to the plaintiffs' 
dairy cows, nor does it specify what facts the court determined were important to its ultimate 
holding. Therefore, the record in De Vries cannot be compared with the record in the current 
case. Most importantly, comparing the record in the current case to the record in any previous 
case is not an appropriate inquiry for this Court on interlocutory appeal. Therefore, Defendants' 
reliance on De Vries is misplaced. 
As set forth above, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a physical injury to their property. Idaho 
law has consistently drawn a bright-line between losses that are parasitic to injury or damage to 
"other property" and those which are the result of shortcomings in the performance of the 
product sold. Here, Plaintiffs' claims arise out of injury and damage to Plaintiffs' property as a 
result of a dangerous defect in the milking equipment. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claims arise out of 
Defendants' duty as a manufacturer and seller of the milking equipment to take care that the 
products they sell will not be unreasonably dangerous and will not cause injury to person or 
property. Thus, this duty and Plaintiffs' claims are based solely in tort and are not precluded by 
the economic loss rule. 
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B. The Court Should Not Expand the Economic Loss Rule to Preclude Recovery 
of Plaintiffs' Losses. 
I. Defendants Failed to Present Arguments for tile Proposed Expansion 
of the Economic Loss Rule at the Trial Court. 
Defendants' only purely legal argument relates to whether this Court should expand 
Idaho's economic loss rule to preclude recovery for property damage and parasitic economic loss 
when it is "foreseeable" that the purchased product will interact with the damaged property at the 
time of the purchase. In making this argument, Defendants rely heavily on the analysis from two 
fellow state supreme courts in Neibarger v. Universal Cooperatives, 486 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. 
1992) and Grams v. Milk Prod's, Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167 (Wis. 2005). Defendants never made 
this argument for the expansion of the economic loss rule, nor did they cite the Grams or 
Neibarger decisions at the district court level. Therefore, Defendants are attempting to apply this 
expanded "foreseeability" analysis to the economic loss rule for the first time on appeal. It is 
axiomatic that the Idaho Supreme Court "will not consider arguments raised for the first time on 
appeal." Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 186 P.3d 663, 668 (2008). Consistent with well-
established Idaho law, this Court must not consider Defendants' "foreseeability" argument, 
which was raised for the first time in the context of the current interlocutory appeal. 
First, because Defendants' "foreseeability" arguments were not raised to the district court, 
the district court clearly could not have considered Defendants' proposed "foreseeability" 
expansion in denying summary judgment. It is inappropriate for Defendants to ask this Court to 
overturn the district court's denial of summary judgment for reasons which were never before the 
district court for adjudication in the first place. 
More importantly, the question of foreseeability of harm or damages is a question of fact 
for the jury. Hunter v. State Dept. of Corrections, 138 Idaho 44, 49, 57 P.3d 755 (2002); Appel v. 
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LePage, 135 Idaho 133, 137, 15 P.3d 1141 (2000). Even if this Court accepts the Defendants' 
foreseeability analysis, a jury must determine issues of fact relevant to whether it was foreseeable 
that Plaintiffs' herd would be injured by the milking equipment. Defendants attempt to argue, 
without any factual basis, that such an injury is foreseeable, and Plaintiffs' claims for economic 
losses should therefore be excluded under their expanded version of the economic loss rule. 
However, there has been no discovery or factual development directly on this issue, nor is there 
any record to speak of in the district court as to whether the injury to Plaintiffs' herd is 
"foreseeable" in the context of Defendants' proposed new rule. Defendants cannot be allowed to 
alter the rules in midstream to the obvious detriment of Plaintiffs. 
Moreover, as a purely legal matter, Defendants present no reason why Idaho's well-
established precedent regarding the economic loss rule and the "other property" exception should 
be altered or discarded in the first place. "[T]he rule of stare decisis dictates that we follow it, 
unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless 
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued 
injustice." Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978 (1990), 
Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 592, 130 P.3d 1127 (2006). 
Defendants ignore the constraints of stare decisis and hastily argue for a sweeping ex_pansion of 
the economic loss rule. Defendants do not and cannot argue that Idaho's established precedent 
on the economic loss rule is manifestly wrong or unjust. As demonstrated below, the current 
precedent is properly tailored to conform to sound policies and principles underlying product 
liability law and the origin of the economic loss rule. Therefore, there is no basis for any 
argument that the established rule is at odds with clear principles and policies of the law. 
Defendants' brief plainly begs an important question: why does the economic loss rule 
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need to be expanded? No sound reason has been provided. Again, Defendants are plainly 
attempting to inject controversy into a well-established rule of Idaho law and improperly utilize 
interlocutory appeal to challenge established Idaho law. Defendants dive into an analysis of their 
proposed "foreseeability" expansion without even discussing why they believe the rule should be 
changed in the first place. As demonstrated below, there is no colorable reason in support of an 
expansion of the economic loss rule beyond its well-reasoned boundaries as established by 
existing Idaho precedent. More importantly, Defendants have completely failed to make the 
threshold showing that the established Idaho precedent needs a reworking. Therefore, 
Defendants' arguments for an expansion of the economic loss rule must be rejected. 
2. Expansion of the Economic Loss Rule is Inconsistent with the 
Fundamental Principles of Product Liability and Tort Law and 
Would Allocate the Risk of Economic Loss Resulting from Dangerous 
Defects in Products to the Consumer. 
Defendants' only purely legal argument in the current appeal improperly seeks to expand 
the economic loss rule where there is no difference of opinion as to Idaho law. As previously 
demonstrated, under well-established prior Idaho law, Plaintiffs' claims for damages are 
recoverable in tort. (See Infra Sections N.A. 1. & 2.). Defendants, however, propose that the 
Court affirmatively expand Idaho's economic loss rule to preclude recovery for Plaintiffs in the 
current case. As discussed in more detail below, Defendants proposed expansion of the 
economic loss rule is completely undefined and fails to provide any discernable rule or workable 
standard which could be applied consistently by lower courts. 
In addition to being undefined, Defendants' proposed expansion of the economic loss rule 
is directly at odds with sound public policy and basic principles of product liability and tort law. 
Defendants' arguments in support of their proposed expansion of the economic loss rule 
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originate in language from the Neibarger and Grams cases in which the courts held that the 
economic loss rule should apply when "preventing the subject risk was one of the contractual 
expectations motivating the purchase of the defective product." Grams, 699 N.W.2d at 534. 
Defendants therefore propose to expand the economic loss rule to preclude recovery for losses if 
the purchased product "is expected and intended to interact with other products and property'' 
and it causes damage to that other property. Id. at 535. In addition to providing a wholly 
unworkable standard, the proposed expansion is inconsistent with important public policy 
considerations which form the basis of product liability law. 
As a matter of public policy, products liability law is designed to encourage the 
manufacture of safer products by placing the responsibility to reduce the hazards of dangerously 
defective products on the manufacturer, which is the party most capable of diagnosing and 
preventing possible defects and dangers. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 
875, 881 (1997); East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica DeLaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866-
67 (1986). According to this sound policy, "the seller, by marketing his product for use and 
consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the 
consuming public who may be injured by it.. .that public policy demands that the burden of 
accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who 
market them .... " Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, cmt c. Defendants propose an 
expansion of the economic loss rule that, contrary to this well-accepted public policy, would 
place the risk of losses flowing from property damage caused by a defective product at the feet of 
the consumer. 
Citing the Grams case, Defendants argue that the economic loss rule should preclude 
liability if a product is expected and intended to interact with other property. Defendants in fact 
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go so far as to espouse a rule which would "simply bar[] tort claims in commercial settings and 
relegate[]their resolutions to the UCC." (App. Br. 5). This would be a dramatic expansion of the 
economic loss rule to the detriment of consumers. Under Defendants' expanded interpretation of 
the economic loss rule, the consumer, not the manufacturer or seller, must become aware of all of 
the prospective dangers of the products it purchases and the ways in which such products can 
damage its property. In this case, for instance, Plaintiffs, the operators of a dairy, must not only 
become familiar with veterinary medicine, but also must be knowledgeable in the area of 
electrical engineering such that it can understand the operation of the milking equipment and be 
prepared for any damages a defect might cause. 
The responsibility for this kind of intimate knowledge and education regarding products 
sold in commerce is properly allocated to the manufacturer, who is more familiar with the 
products it sells. As the court stated in Seely, "[a] consumer should not be charged at the will of 
the manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on the market." 
45 Cal. Rptr. at 23,403 P.2d at 151. As a maxim of product liability Jaw, this risk is best borne 
by the manufacturer. Therefore, Defendants' proposed expansion is directly contrary to sound 
public policy and must be rejected. 
3. Defendants' Proposed Expansion of the Economic Loss Rule Does Not 
Promote Any of the Policies Motivating the Adoption of the Rule. 
The economic loss rule was adopted in Idaho in order to avoid blurring the line between 
tort recovery and warranty recovery. Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 333-
35, 581 P.2d 784 (1978). Generally, it was crafted to prevent a party from recovering economic 
losses in tort related to the performance of the product, losses which are within the scope of 
contract and warranty law. Id. Courts have determined that damages which are purely economic 
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losses without any concomitant injury or damage to person or property are most likely 
attributable to the failure of the product to perform as expected. Therefore, courts have drawn 
the line that without any other damage or injury to person or property, such economic losses are 
relegated to the dealings of the parties and to contract or warranty remedies. 
On the other hand, "'[t]here can be no doubt that the seller's liability for negligence 
covers any kind of physical harm, including not only personal injuries, but also property 
damage ... as well as damage to any other property in the vicinity."' Id. at 333 (quoting W. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS,§ 101 at 665 (4th ed. 1971)). This liability arises 
out of a common law duty owed to all consumers who purchase the seller's goods, and is 
remediable in tort. A negligent party is generally liable for all damages that are the natural and 
ordinary result of such negligence. Jacobson v. McMillan, 64 Idaho 351, 132 P.2d 773 (1943). 
Therefore, as demonstrated above, Idaho law has permitted recovery of economic losses if they 
are parasitic to such physical harm to other property. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P .2d 1195. 
These damages arise directly out of a breach of this very common law duty to protect consumers 
from injury to person or property. Despite their economic character, therefore, economic losses 
related to physical harm to person or property do not stem from warranty, but are properly 
grounded and recoverable in tort. 
The exception to the economic loss rule as announced in Duffin properly draws the line 
between contract and tort remedies. It best assures that parties will not be able to collect 
damages in a tort suit for the failure or breach of a duty that is within the realm of contract. 
Simply stated, a consumer should "fairly be charged with the risk that the product will not match 
his economic expectations;" but "[a] consumer should not be charged at the will of the 
manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on the market." 
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Clark, 99 Idaho at 334, 581 P.2d 784 (quoting Seely, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23, 403 P.2d at 151.). All 
damages resulting from that physical injury should therefore be recoverable in tort. The 
characterization of the loss as economic is not the primary inquiry in the application of the 
economic loss rule. "'The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the 
responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products.'" Id. 
The "other property" exception, which allows recovery of economic loss only when it is 
parasitic to damage or injury to person or property, is a proper expression of the policies 
underlying the adoption of the economic loss rule. It properly protects against recovery of 
damages for contract-related claims in tort action by precluding recovery of purely economic 
losses, which courts have viewed as more properly protected by contract law. At the same time, 
it does not erode or invade on the right of consumers to recover all damages attributable to a 
manufacturer's or a seller's negligence in a tort action. This rule strikes the proper balance 
between tort and contract law. As previously demonstrated, Defendants are unable to articulate 
any reason why this well-established rule should be altered in any way. 
Conversely, Defendants' proposed expansion of the rule would erode and invade upon 
tort law. Simply stated, Defendants' proposed expansion of the economic loss rule is contrary to 
basic assumptions underlying the relationship between consumer and seller/manufacturer, and it 
would eliminate remedies which are important to the protection of consumers and their property. 
Consequently, Defendants' proposed expansion of the economic loss rule does not serve the 
purposes underlying the adoption of the rule and should be rejected. 
4. Defendants' Proposed Expansion of the Economic Loss Rule is 
Ambiguous and Unworkable and Fails to Provide any Clear 
Standard. 
As stated above, Defendants cite Neibarger and Grams for their argument in favor of an 
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expansion of the economic loss rule in Idaho. Defendants argue that the Court should abandon 
the bright-line standard set forth in Duffin and Myers allowing recovery of economic losses when 
they are parasitic to injury to other property. In truth, it is difficult to divine any discernable 
standard for the scope of the economic loss rule from the arguments Defendants have proposed in 
their brief. At the very least, it can be said that Defendants, relying on Grams, argue the Court 
should adopt some flexible standard in which the "other property" exception does not include 
property which is expected to and foreseeably may interact with the product purchased. 
Defendants provide no definition or direction as to when it is foreseeable that other property may 
interact with a purchased product, other than that Defendants believe this "foreseeability'' caveat 
should apply in the current case. Defendants' proposed "foreseeability'' expansion of the 
economic loss rule fails to delineate any standard that can be applied from case to case, is 
undefined and is highly problematic. 
First, Defendants' arguments rely heavily on the Grams decision from the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, a decision that has been subject to broad criticism from judges and 
commentators for its limitless expansion of the economic loss rule. As the dissenting branch of 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court on this issue has stated, "[l)ike the ever-expanding, all-consuming 
alien life form portrayed in the 1958 B-movie classic The Blob, the economic loss doctrine seems 
to be a swelling globule on the legal landscape of this state." Grams, 699 N.W.2d at 539 
(Abrahamson, CJ., dissenting). Later opinions, noting the globular expansion of the economic 
loss rule as a result of Grams, warn that "jurisprudence continues to devour unsuspecting tort 
claims that it finds in its path. Like the Blob, the more it eats, the more it grows." I 325 North 
Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, LTD, 716 N.W.2d 822 (Wis. 2006) (Bradley, J., dissenting). One 
commentator observed that, in part as a result of Grams, "[ o )ver the last decade ... the [ economic 
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loss rule's] application has been radically expanded, narrowing and in some cases effectively 
eliminating a variety of common law tort causes of action." Cane, R. Thomas & Sullivan, Sheila, 
More Litigation to Come: Exceptions to the Economic Loss Doctrine, 78-NOV Wis. Law. 10, 10 
(2005). 
Not only has the decision in Grams resulted in an elimination of viable common law tort 
causes of action, it has also resulted in an increased number of published cases in Wisconsin 
regarding the economic loss rule. 1325 North Van Buren, 716 N.W.2d at 841 (Wis. 2006) 
("Only Florida rivals Wisconsin in its use of the economic loss doctrine")(Bradley, J ., 
dissenting). The dismantling of the economic loss rule in Wisconsin by Grams, therefore, has 
resulted in increased uncertainty as to the meaning of the rule, increased litigation regarding the 
meaning of the rule at the highest courts in the state, and necessarily, a dramatic increase in 
litigation costs for consumers. Therefore, the effects of the Grams decision are clear: the court's 
artificial expansion of the economic loss rule eliminated viable and deserving tort claims and 
created an increase in litigation due to confusion as to the meaning of the rule. 
These same dangers are evident in Defendants' attempts to apply Grams to preclude 
Plaintiffs' claims in the current case. As demonstrated above, Plaintiffs have stated a viable 
claim for economic losses based in tort under established law. It is difficult to determine how 
Defendants' proposed "foreseeability" expansion would apply in the current case. What types of 
property damage caused by the milking equipment are "foreseeable"? Is it foreseeable that the 
milking equipment will interact with the various buildings on the dairy farm? Does this extend 
to other machinery used in the dairy operations? Where should the Court draw the line? 
As the dissent in the Grams case discussed, "foreseeability" and "disappointed 
expectations" must not pollute the inquiry into whether other property has been damaged: 
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To my mind, "disappointed expectations" and "other property'' are not mutually 
exclusive principles. Take, for example, a car dealer's defective car that 
spontaneously lurches backwards even though the motor has been properly turned 
off. The defective car driving in reverse destroys the garage door. Since the 
expectation is that the car will operate only when engaged, will not be self-
operating in reverse, and will not spontaneously destroy anything behind it, the 
majority opinion's disappointed expectations rule would, if applied literally, bar 
recovery in tort for damage to the garage door. 
Grams, 699 N.W.2d at 185 (Abrahamson, CJ., dissenting). As Chief Justice Abrahamson 
continued, this "interpretation of the 'other property' exception is so narrow that it is 
unworkable; almost nothing will qualify for the exception. If applied literally, the majority's 
articulation of the "other property'' exception might completely eliminate the exception to the 
economic loss doctrine." Id. at 184. There is simply no way to adopt a workable standard based 
on Defendants' arguments in this case. 
On the other hand, as stated above, Idaho law as set forth in Duffin and Myers, has 
established essentially a bright-line and highly manageable rule: if the defective condition causes 
iajury to property other than the product purchased, that injury sounds in tort and economic 
losses parasitic to that iajury are recoverable. This rule is practical and manageable, and it 
provides a standard which can be applied easily from case to case. On the other hand, 
Defendants' "foreseeability" standard has no explicit bounds and cannot be applied consistently 
from case to case. Courts, therefore, will not be able to apply this foreseeability standard without 
engaging a fact-intensive and case-by-case analysis of the intent and considerations of the parties 
at the time of the transaction. Defendants' proposed "foreseeability" analysis would leave the 
courts without a discemable standard with which to apply the economic loss rule. 
Defendants have failed to provide any persuasive reason to throw the economic loss rule 
into flux. The expansion Defendants argue for is inconsistent with fundamental policies of 
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product liability and tort law. Furthermore, the expansion does not promote any of the policies 
motivating the adoption of the economic loss rule. Under these circumstances, the Court should 
not affirmatively expand the economic loss rule. 
5. Other Courts have Considered and Rejected the Defendants' 
Proposed Expansion of the Economic Loss Rule. 
As stated previously, Defendants rely primarily on the Grams and Neibarger cases in 
arguing for expansion of the economic loss rule. When faced with the same or similar 
arguments, numerous other courts have considered and rejected the approach of the Grams and 
Neibarger courts espoused by Defendants in the current case. See 2-J Corp. v. Tice, 126 F.3d 
539 (3d. Cir. 1997); Gunkel v. Renovations, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. 2005); Mariposa Farms, 
LLC v. Westfalia-Surge, Inc., No. CIV-03-0779, 2005 WL 6104101 (D. N.M. 2005); Hamilage 
Farms, L.L.C. v. Westfalia-Surge, Inc., No. 4:01CV3327, 2003 WL 1824932 (D. Neb. 2003); 
Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Whaley, 2008 WL 3914896 at* 3 (D. Md. 2008)( "I am not persuaded 
... that the Maryland courts would apply the 'foreseeability' ... approach .... "). As the court in 
2-J stated, "[w]e are .aware that a number of courts ... have ruled that the economic loss doctrine 
bars tort recovery where the 'other property' damaged was always likely to have been injured 
upon the failure of 'the product' itself. However, it is also true that numerous courts have 
rejected this expansion of the economic loss doctrine. We find the latter cases more pursasive 
.,." 126 F.3d at 544 n. 4 (citations omitted). 
Like Idaho, Kansas has adopted the economic loss rule. Prendiville v. Contemporary 
Homes, Inc., 83 P.3d 1257, 1259-60 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004). Also like Idaho, Kansas courts allow 
recovery of economic loss when there is physical damage to other property. Elite Professionals, 
Inc. v. Carrier Corp., 827 P.2d 1195 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992); Northwest Arkansas Masonry, Inc. v. 
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Summit Specialty Prods., Inc., 31 P.3d 982, 987 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Saratoga Fishing, 
520 U.S. 875, 879). Kansas courts have generally faced the same types of issues Idaho courts 
have faced with respect to the scope and application of the economic loss rule. See, e.g., 
Prendiville, 83 P.3d at 1264 (holding that damage to one portion of a home caused by defective 
construction of another portion is barred by the economic loss rule because the home is one 
product); Blahd, 141 Idaho at 301, 108 P.3d 956 (same). Experience in Kansas, like Idaho, has 
shown that this approach best equips courts with the capability to address issues raised by the 
economic loss rule and best reconciles the underlying policies which cause tension in the rule. 
In general, sound application of basic tort based principles such as causation and duty can 
eliminate confusion and avoid the apparent need for an artificial expansion of the economic loss 
rule as devised by Defendants in this case. The approach taken by the Neibarger and Grams 
courts and for which Defendants argue here is not the best approach. The favorable approach, 
other states have found, is one which reconciles policies underlying product liability law with 
those underlying the principles which precipitated the adoption of the economic loss rule in the 
first place. Additionally, the favored approach must adopt a standard which can be applied 
consistently. Settled Idaho law as expressed in Duffin reflects such an approach. The expansion 
to the economic loss rule for which Defendants argue in this case, therefore, must be rejected. 
C. Genuine Issues of Fact Exist Regarding Exceptional Circumstances or a 
Special Relationship as an Exception to the Economic Loss Rnle. 
Regardless of the Court's determination of the issues relating to the "other property 
exception," there has been a long-standing exception to the economic loss rule where a "special 
relationship" exists between the parties. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d 1195; McAlvain v. 
General Ins. Co. of America, 97 Idaho 777, 554 P.2d 955 (1976). Generally, the case law 
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permits recovery of economic losses in tort actions when the plaintiff establishes a "special 
relationship" between the parties. Id. A special relationship is one in which it would be 
equitable to impose a duty upon the defendant to exercise due care to avoid purely economic loss 
and allocate the risk of such loss to the defendant. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d 1195. 
In the current case, the lower court determined that there were not sufficient facts to send 
the current case to the jury regarding the special relationship exception to the economic loss rule. 
Defendants now argue that there is no evidence of exceptional circumstances or a special 
relationship m the record. As demonstrated below, there is ample evidence of a special 
relationship m the record that demonstrates a genume issue of material fact regarding the 
existence of a special relationship. If the Court reexamines the record with respect to the district 
court's findings regarding damage or injury to property as Defendants suggest, the Court must 
also review the district court's determination of the special relationship issue. Upon such a 
review, it is apparent that summary judgment on this issue was not proper. 
As an initial matter, the existence of a "special relationship" as an exception to the 
economic loss rule in this case involves numerous questions of fact. As to the existence of a 
legal duty, courts in Idaho have held that a special relationship exists "where an entity holds itself 
out to the public as having expertise regarding a specialized function, and by doing so, knowingly 
induces reliance on its performance of that function." Blahd, 141 Idaho at 301, 108 P.3d 996 
(citing Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d 1195). In such cases where there is no legally 
established special relationship, i.e. a doctor/patient or attorney/client relationship, the existence 
of a special relationship necessarily involves questions of fact to determine whether the entity 
holds itself out to the public as having sufficient expertise and whether it knowingly induces 
reliance on such expertise. See Blickenstaff v. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 578, 97 P.3d 439 
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(2004)(holding that genuine issues of fact regarding the existence of a special relationship 
precluded summary judgment); General Fire & Cas. Co. v. Guy Carpenter & Co, inc., 2006 WL 
3239365 (D. Idaho 2006)("there exist genuine issues of material fact as to whether [the 
defendants] were in a special relationship such that the economic-loss rule would not apply"). 
The court's analysis in Duffin demonstrates that the determination of whether a special 
relationship exists in this context inherently involves questions of fact. In Duffin, the court 
engaged in a factual analysis to determine whether a special relationship existed, including 
reviewing the facts related to whether the defendant held itself out as having specialized 
expertise to induce reliance on that specialized expertise by the public. Duffin, I 26 Idaho at 
1008, 895 P .2d 1195. This determination is inherently factual, and cannot be made without a 
proper review of the factual record. 
Eventually, in Duffin the court found that a special relationship existed between the 
plaintiffs, a family farm, and the Idaho Crop Improvement Association ("ICIA"), an organization 
authorized by the state to certify agricultural products. The plaintiffs sued the !CIA alleging 
negligence in the certification of certain seed. In finding the existence of a special relationship, 
the court stated the following: 
Although McA!vain dealt with the existence of a professional or quasi-
professional relationship, we do not · Jimit the "special relationship" exception 
exclusively to such cases. ICIA has held itself out as having expertise in the 
performance of a specialized function; it is the only entity which can certify seed 
potatoes in the state of!daho. !CIA knows that seed is sold at a higher price based 
on the fact that it is certified. Indeed, it has engaged in a marketing campaign, for 
the benefit of its members, the very purpose of which is to induce reliance by 
purchasers on the fact that seed has been certified. Under such circumstances, 
!CIA occupies a special relationship with those whose reliance it has knowingly 
induced. 
Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d 1195. 
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Similar circumstances as those described in Duffin are present in the current case. For 
instance, before dealers are allowed to install the ProFORM milking system ihey must be 
certified by W estfalia, and must be recertified every five years. Furthermore, it is uncontroverted 
that Westfalia has superior knowledge regarding the operation of the ProFORM system, and is 
more knowledgeable regarding the ProFORM system than dairy fanners such as the Plaintiffs in 
this case. There is uncontroverted testimony from Mr. Patterson that dairy farmers trust and rely 
upon Westfalia about how to repair and install the ProFORM system. 
The above facts demonstrate at the very least a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
the existence of a special relationship between Plaintiffs and W estfalia. Indeed, Plaintiffs are the 
only party to present any facts relevant to determining the special relationship issue. In their 
brief to this Court, and in the limited briefing on summary judgment, Defendants simply relied 
on blanket conclusory statements that no evidence of a special relationship exists. As 
demonstrated above, this is flatly contrary to the facts in the record. 
Contrary to the district court's finding and Defendants' arguments here, there is 
substantial evidence of a special relationship between Plaintiffs and W estfalia. This evidence 
demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Therefore, Plaintiffs should be permitted 
to take their claims of a special relationship to a jury. 
D. The District Court Erred in Granting U. S. Dairy's Oral Motion for 
Summary Judgment Without Briefing or Factual Statements in Support. 
Each of the original Defendants in this case, Freedom Electric, Inc., W estfalia, Earl 
Patterson and U.S. Dairy, filed separate motions for summary judgment in this case. Westfalia's 
motion and briefing argued that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the economic loss rule and by the 
Myers case, and that the special relationship exception to the economic loss rule does not apply 
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to this case. See R., Vol. I, pp. 99-104, 147-151. Defendant U.S. Dairy, however, filed its own 
motion for summary judgment, which was explicitly limited to Plaintiffs' breach of contract and 
breach of express or implied warranty claims. See R., Vol. I, pp. 105-113. U.S. Dairy provided 
absolutely no briefing as to the issue of the economic loss rule at the district court level, and 
made no statement of relevant facts regarding its relationship with Plaintiffs. For the first time at 
the hearing on January 25, 2008, U.S. Dairy's counsel argued that Plaintiffs' claims against U.S. 
Dairy were barred by the economic loss rule. For the first time, U.S. Dairy argued that there is 
no special relationship between Plaintiffs and U.S. Dairy, and raised evidence and argument 
which was well beyond the scope of its motion for summary judgment and not set forth in its 
statement ofrelevant facts in support of its motion for summary judgment. 
Particularly, on the issue of special relationship, U.S. Dairy completely failed to provide 
any factual basis from which the district court could analyze the relationship between Plaintiffs 
and U.S. Dairy; counsel simply stated during the argument, without briefing or reference to a 
factual record, that "[ w ]ith respect to the special relationship, I agree with W•astfalia." See Tr., 
Vol. I, 25:5-6. U.S. Dairy's "me too" approach ignores the fact that, even if Westfalia 
demonstrated there was not a sufficient factual record to send the issue of special relationship 
between Plaintiffs and Westfalia to a jury, those facts have absolutely nothing to do with the 
facts regarding the relationship between Plaintiffs and U.S. Dairy. 
Despite the fact that U.S. Dairy had not filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue 
of the economic Joss rule or the existence of a special relationship, the district court allowed U.S. 
Dairy to make arguments on these matters. Although Plaintiffs had no opportunity to make 
arguments as to the factual record, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of U.S. 
Dairy finding that there were no facts which would suggest a special relationship. 
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Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure require that the motion with supporting affidavits and 
facts and a supporting brief be served at least 28 days prior to the hearing on sunnnary judgment. 
I.R.C.P. 56( c ). Summary judgment motions must be decided upon the relevant facts as shown in 
the record, not upon facts which might have been shown. Verbillis v. Dependable Appliance Co., 
107 Idaho 335, 689 P.2d 227 (1984). The procedure for summary judgment requires a party to 
present its factual and legal bases for summary judgment so that the opposing party may have an 
opportunity to respond. In this case, Plaintiffs had no opportunity to respond to U.S. Dairy's "me 
too" motion at the hearing. 
While the court may rule for either party, and may even grant sunnnary judgment in favor 
of the non-moving party when appropriate, a district court may only rule on the issues placed 
before it pursuant to a valid motion. Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677, 39 P.3d 612 
(2001). In Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 887 P.2d 1034 (1995), the 
plaintiff sued the defendant for negligence. The defendant filed for sunnnary judgment, claiming 
there was no genuine issue of fact regarding the issues of duty and breach. Although the district 
court found that genuine issues of fact existed as to the issues of duty and breach, the court sua 
sponte entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that there were no genuine 
issues of material fact regarding the issue of proximate causation. In overturning the district 
court's entry of summary judgment, the Court stated the following: 
This Court has consistently held that when a party moves for summary judgment, 
the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 
rests with that party. Thus, it follows that if the moving party fails to challenge an 
element of the nomnovant's case, the initial burden placed on the moving party 
has not been met and therefore does not shift to the nomnovant. In the present 
case, not only was there no evidence showing a lack of proximate cause, but no 
argument was even offered to the district court on this element of negligence by 
respondents. The district court improperly seized upon the proximate cause issue 
sua sponte. The burden never shifted to [the plaintiffs] to provide evidence of 
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proximate causation because the respondents never raised the issue in the first 
place. 
Thomson, 126 Idaho at 531, 887 P.2d 1034. The same is true of the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of U.S. Dairy on the issue of special relationship in this case. 
U.S. Dairy never filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of the economic loss 
rule. Moreover, U.S. Dairy never submitted a statement of facts or a factual record relevant to 
the relationship between Plaintiffs and U.S. Dairy. Plaintiffs never had an opportunity to respond 
to any arguments U.S. Dairy may present regarding the existence of a special relationship. As 
many courts have found, this opportunity to respond is a matter of due process. Portsmouth 
Square, Inc. v. Shareholders Protective Committee, 770 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 1985)(holding 
that due process requires that "the party against whom [summary] judgment was entered had a 
full and fair opportunity to develop and present facts and legal arguments in support of its 
position."). 
The only support U.S. Dairy presented for its "motion" were conclusory statements that it 
believes a special relationship does not exist. U.S. Dairy did not even discuss the facts pertaining 
to its specialized knowledge of the milking equipment or Plaintiffs' reliance on such knowledge. 
As such, U.S. Dairy never met its initial burden of showing a lack of genuine issues of fact, and 
therefore failed to shift the burden to refute that showing to Plaintiffs. Under these 
circumstances, as was the case in Thomson, the district court "improperly seized upon" the issue 
of special relationship between Plaintiffs and U.S. Dairy and improperly entered summary 
judgment against Plaintiffs. The district court's holding as to special relationship between 
Plaintiffs and U.S. Dairy, therefore, must be overturned. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For the above and foregoing reasons, this case must be remanded for trial. As a tbreshold 
matter, Defendants invite the Court to engage a scope of review that is beyond the Court's 
jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal. Additionally, as a substantive matter, Plaintiffs have stated a 
valid tort-based claim for property damage and economic loss parasitic to that property damage. 
Plaintiffs' claims for such damages are therefore not precluded by the economic loss rule. 
Furthermore, Defendants' arguments for expansion of the economic loss rule must be rejected. 
Finally, there are factual issues precluding summary judgment on the issue of special 
relationship, and the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on this 
issue, especially in favor of US Dairy who had not filed a summary judgment issue pertaining to 
this issue, constitute error. The Court must therefore reject Defendants' arguments and remand 
the case for trial. 
DATED this 15th day of September, 2008. 
PEDE EN and WHITEHEAD 
m A. Whitehead, ISB #6656 
mey for Respondents/Cross-Appellants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DIST~ft~ra\it~1 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY O~E,f,"8-S1aleotldaho 
. · MIKE VTERSTRA and SUSAN VIERSTRA, 
d/b/a VlERSTRA DAIRY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 















Case 'Kio CV QQ 3408 D-""'1< 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
We, the jury, answer the questions submitted to us in this Special Verdict as 
follows: 
QUESTION NO. I: Was there negligence on the p;irt of Idaho Power Company 
which was a proximate cause of the Vier$tra's claimed damages? 
. ANSWER: ~ YES __ NO 
lf you answered the above question "Yes," please com:inue. If you answered the 
above question "No," please skip Questio11s 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, and go to Question No. 7. 
QUESTION NO. 2: Do yo·u find any negligent act or actll of defendant, to have 
occurred after August 11, 1997? 
ANSWER: ~YES ____ NO 
QUESTION NO. 3: Was there negligence on the part of the Plaintiffs Mike 
Vierstra and Susan Vierstra doing business as Vierstra Dairy, which was a proximate 
· cause of their claimed damages? 
ANSWER: _j.__YES __ NO 
QUESTlON NO. 4: Do you find other individuals such as Steve Dahlquist or 
Steve Foust negligent and, if so, such individual's negligence was a proximate cause of 
plaintiffs'··c1amages? 
. ANSWER: __ YBS _:i__No 
As to those persons you find to be negligent, you are asked to determine the 
pe~ntage of fault for that party or person, and enter. the percentage on the appropriate 
line. If you find one of the listed parties or persons is not negligent, place a zero next to 
that party or person. Your total percentages must equal l 00%. 
QUESTION NO. 5: What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of 
the following: 
To Idaho Power Company 
To Plaintiffs Mike and Susan Vierstra 
To others (Steve Dahlquist or Steve Foust) Rf % 
Total must equal 100 % 
QUESTION NO. 6: What is the toral amount of compensatory damages sustained 
by the plaintiffs Mike Vierstra and Susan Vierstra doing business as Vierstra Dairy from 
August 11, 1997, to December 31, 2003, as a result of negligence? . . o/ 
. ANSWER: $ lo, (;10. l7S 
QUESTION NO. 7: Did the defendant, Idaho Power Company create a nuisance 
which proximately caused plaintiffs' claimed damages? 
ANSWER: _y_YES NO 
If your answer to Question No. 7 is "No," then do nor answer Questions 8, 9, l 0, 
I ! , 12, or 13, but go to Questions l 4 and 15, and answer them, if applicable. If your 
answer to Question No, 7 is "Ya~," please continue. 
QUESTION NO. 8: Do you find any act by defendant [daho Power, which 
proximately caused the nuisance, occurred after August 11, 1996? 
ANSWER: __ NO 
QUESTION NO. 9: Lf you found that Idaho Power Company created a nuisance 
which proximately caused plaintiffs' claimed damages, is such nuisance 
abatable/correctable? 
ANSWER: _){__YES __ NO 
QUESTION NO. IO: Did the plaintiffs.Jose profits as a result of nuisance from 
January I, 1997, to December 31, 2003? 
ANSWER: _LYES __ NO 
If your answer to Question No. 10 is "No," please continue but do not answer 
Question No. 11. If your answer to Question No. IO is "Yes," please continue, ·and 
· answer Question No. l l. 
QUESTION NO. l l: What amount of profits did the plaintiffs lose as a result of 
nuisance from January l, 1997, to December 31, 2003 (remember you can't award 
damages for both negligence and n1.1isimce for the same period of time)? 
. 58/ 
ANSWER: $ tpl)L:,. 31q . 
QUESTION NO. 12: Did the plaintiffs suffer interference.with their enjoyment 
of their property and with the enjoyment of their lives while using the prnperty, as a 





ff your answer to Question No. 12 is ''No," please skip Question No. 13. If your 
answer to Question No. 12 is "Yes," please continue. 
QUESTION NO. 13: What amount of money do you award to compensate the 
plaintiffs for the interference with their enjoyment of their property and with the 
enjoyment of their lives while using the property, as a result of nuisance from January l, 
1997, t<:> December 31, 2003? 
ANSWER: 
If, but only if you found Idaho Power negligent,. and its negligence proximately 
.::aused damage to the plaintiffs_ (Question No. !), may you consider punitive damages, · 
and answer the next questions. 
QUESTION NO .. 14: Were any of the acts of Idaho Power which proximately 
caused damage to the plaintiffs, an extreme deviation from reasonable standar<;ls of 
conduct, wanton or grossly negligent, such that you wish to assess puniti{,e damages 
against the defondant, Idaho Power Company? 
ANSWER: __.:i:,_YES 
lfyou answered Question No. 14 ''No," please sign the vei;dict. If you answered 
Question No. 14 "Yes," please answer Question No. 15. 
QUESTION NO. 15: What is the total amouut of punitive damages that should 
be awarded the plaintiffs in order_ to punish. the defendant and deter the defendant and 
others from engaging in similar conduct in the future? 
.ANSWER: 
DATED thi/l tD"".t,, day of February, . 2004 .. 
' -.i 
Slip Copy, 2006 WL 1582179 (D.Idaho), 60 ucc Rep.Serv.2d 154 
Motions. Pleadlngs and Fllings 
United States District Court, 
D. Idaho. 
Abraham DeVRIES, an individual; Curtis Devries, an individual; and Marvin Devries, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DeLAVAL, INC., a Delaware corporation; Blue Diamond DeLaval LLC, dba Dairy Services, a Delaware 
limited liability company, Defendants. 
No. CV 04-136-S-EJL. 
June 1, 2006. 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 
MIKEL H. WILLIAMS, Magistrate Judge. 
INTRODUCTION 
* l Plaintiffs Abraham De Vries, Curtis De Vries, and Marvin De Vries ( collectively "DeVrlesn) filed this 
action against Defendants Delaval, Inc. and Blue Diamond DeLaval, LLC (collectively "Delaval"), 
alleging claims for breach. of contract, strict liability, and fraud. Currently pending before the Court for 
its consideration are the following motions: 
(1) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 23), filed on January 5, 2006; and 
(1) Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend/Correct to Add Claim for Punitive Damages (Docket No. 32), filed 
on January 6, 2006. On March 24, 2006, the Court heard oral argument on the motions. 
Having reviewed all briefing submitted, as well as other pertinent documents in the Court's file, the 




Plaintiff Abraham "Abe" DeVries is the owner of a large dairy operation in the state of California. In 
1998, he started the DeVries Dairy Facillty near Kuna, Idaho and funded the startup of a dairy 
operation for his two sons, Plaintiffs Curtis and Marvin DeVries in the same area. Curtis Devries, In 
partnership with his father operates his dairy farm under the name of Carousel Farms. Marvin 
DeVries, also In partnership with his father, operates his dairy farm under the name of Syringa Farms. 
Both Carousel Farms and Syringa Farms share the Devries Dairy Facility although both the operations 
are maintained separately. ' 
In May 1998, Abe DeVries agreed to purchase a rotary milking system manufactured by DeLaval. 
(Purchase Agreement). The purchase price for the dairy equipment, including Installation of that 
equipment, was $599,999. Abe DeVries purchased the equipment at a discount price because this 
was the first OeLaval rotary system installed in the region and OeLaval hoped it would help with their 
marketing in this area.flit Soon after the DeVries began milking cows with the DeLaval dairy 
equipment, they began to experience problems with the equipment. The DeVrles' complaints focused 
prlmartly on problems relating to the vacuum system, milk-line, takeoffs and related components. As 
the equipment was not working correctly, It was causing some injury to the cows' udders, which 
resulted in related "mastltis" infections, which had to be treated by a veterinarian. 
FNl. Plaintiff Abe DeVries testified that he obtained a substantial discount for the 
purchase of the system from DeLaval. His other two bids were at least $700,000 higher 
than DeLaval. ; 
In the early months of 2000, DeLaval engaged .In extensive efforts to remedy the problems the 
DeVries had been experiencing. The DeVrles asked the DeLaval technicians to examine and repair the 
automatic mllk machine take-offs, computer ID system, sort gate, the shield on the rotary and the 
design flaw that allowed the cows to consistently break stalls on the rotary. Despite the technicians' 
efforts, the DeVries continued to experience problems with the DeLaval dairy equipment. 
In November 2000, in an effort to remedy the continuing problems, representatives of DeLaval 
met with Curtis DeVries, Marvin DeVries, and other members of the Devries family to discuss how to 
resolve the problems caused by the dairy equipment. Ultimately, the DeVries and DeLaval executed 
settlement agreements in February 2001 entitled "Releases" by which DeLaval agreed to remove the 
ALPRo system then installed at the DeVries dairy and replace it with new equipment as detailed in 
Exhibit B attached to the Release ("New Equipment"), Exhibit B described the New Equipment as: (1) 
60 Right-hand EcoDetachers; (2) 60 Detacher controls/valves; (3) 60 Pulsators with individual 
controls; and (4) a four-amp power supply. In addition, DeLaval agreed to provide: 
*2 • Cash payments of $150,000 to Curtis Devries, $50,000 to Marvin Devries, and $50,000 to 
Abe DeVrles, for a total of $200,000 in cash payments. 
• A $69,999 credit to Abe DeVries to cover the remaining amount due to Delaval for the system. 
• Payment of up to $8,370 to a third party fo t~e cost of moving a piece of equipment. 
• Free standard scheduled service for the New and Original Equipment for one year, and a 10% 
discount of such service for two more years. 
• DeLaval also agreed to supply all of the DeVries' needs for cleaners, sanitizersr teat dips, llners 
and filters for a period of three years after the date the Releases were signed-at no charge the first 
year. 
In exchange, Curtis and Marvin DeVries signed a release agreement with DeLaval as follows: 
That he releases and gives up any and all dalms and rights, known and unknown, which he now 
has or may have in the future against Dealer or DeLaval or any of their officers, employees or 
affiliated companies Including, but not llmited to claims for breach of warranty, misrepresentation, 
lost Income, lost milk production, injury to cattle, Increased expenses, or consequential damages of 
any kind caused by or related in any way, directly or indirectly, to the installation, use, operation or 
maintenance of any of the Original Equipment. 
Abe DeVries executed a similarly worded release. In defining "Original Equipment," the release 
documents reference the original Purchase Agreement, which itemizes the equipment installed. 
In addition, the DeVries agreed that the New Equipment would be covered by DeLaval's standard 
one-year Limited Warranty, which the parties agr~ed to extend to a term of three years. The Limited 
Warranty warrants the equipment to be "free fro1rf defects in material and workmanship. •i Through 
the Limited Warranty, Delaval agreed to repair or replace any Item of Equipment which was not as 
warranted, If Delaval was unable to repair the equipment, It agreed to refund the purchase price 
(excluding the cost of Installation labor). The Limited Warranty further excluded any other remedies, 
specifically precluding the DeVries from recovering damages of any kind in excess of a refund of the 
purchase price refund remedy. 
The DeVrles maintain that they only signed the release agreements because they "were desperate 
to fix the problems with the dairy," (Pl's.Rsp.Br.4), as they had allegedly suffered more than $1.5 
million In damages at the time they entered Into the Releases. During the time the Devries and 
DeLaval were negotiating the release agreement, the DeLavar told the DeVrles that It was committed 
to making the dairy equipment work properly. The DeVries further allege that DeLaval assured them 
that they would make the equipment work "no matter what It took, and no matter what the 
cost." (Pl's.Rsp.Br.3.) According to the DeVrles, they reasonably believed that Delaval had taken the 
necessary steps to ensure the recommended changes In the dairy system would cause it to function 
properly in the future based on Delaval's assurances and because the "DeLaval dairy equipment was 
fully Integrated and had been designed, manufactured and installed by DeLaval." Id. The Devries 
state they relied upon DeLaval's representations that It would solve the continuing problems with the 
dairy equipment. 
*3 Delaval began the Installation of the New Equipment after the execution of the three Releases. 
The installation purportedly took much longer than anticipated by the Devries. Without inspecting the 
facility, Mr. Steve Ramer, a DeLaval employee in the Kansas City location, had earlier recommended 
the Installation of the EcoDetachers. The DeVries allege that Mr. Ramer was aware that Delaval had 
experienced significant problems with the EcoDetachers at the time he recommended their installation 
at the DeVries' already problematic dairy facility. In support of this contention, the Devries cite to an 
April 11, 2001 email sent by Mr. Ramer to Mr. Storm, in which Mr. Ramer wrote, "Universal has never 
design[ed] an option for a remote start circuit for an EcoDetacher in a parlor .... There are a number 
of design steps that must be taken prior to this work being done ... [f]allure to take these steps 
almost Insures there will be problems later." See Kurtz Aff., Ex. D, Ex. 18. According to the DeVries, 
DeLaval never Informed them of this potential problem. 
In further support of their allegation that DeLaval improperly Installed the EcoDetachers despite Its 
alleged problems, the Devries refer to another internal email sent on June 13, 2001 by Mr. Storm to 
Bill Thompson, then Vice-President of DeLaval. Mr, Storm informed Mr. Thompson In the email that 
the Devries were experiencing problems with the EcoDetachers and that Mr. Ramer had Informed him 
that morning that "this was not a new problem" and that the problem had been going on for 3-4 
months. See Kurtz Aff, Ex. D, Ex. 16. Mr. Storm continued, "[l]t would have been nice If someone 
could have given us some warning of this problem before we were blind sided out at this particular 
dairy." Id. 
The next day, on June 14, 2001, DeLaval sent an In-house veterinarian, Jeff Durkin, to test the 
system. Durkin Informed the Devries that the system appeared to be functioning properly. The 
DeVrles maintain Durkin did not mention any potential problems with the EcoDetachers at this time. 
In addition, another DeLaval employee, Jim Hipwell, purportedly conducted pulsation tests that 
indicated the equipment fluctuated beyond acceptable levels and that this could cause damage to the 
dairy cow teats. Delaval allegedly did not inform the Devries of this problem; instead, Delaval 
criticized the DeVries' dairy practices, calling the DeVries "a bunch of whiners" and poor managers 
who could not be pleased. (Hipwell Depa. 62: 18; 64: 17-20, Ex. C to Kurtz Aff.). 
The DeVries further allege that the newly installed Delaval equipment never functioned properly, 
although the Devries concede DeLaval made repeated attempts to solve the problems through March 
of 2002. Despite DeLaval's attempts to fix the problems, the Devries maintain that both Curtis and 
Marvin's dairy operations continued to experience high bacteria counts in their milk. Apparently, the 
De Vries saw the somatic cell counts ("SCC'') increase from the range of approximately 300,000 to 
700,000 to 900,000 sec. The expected sec for a dairy operation In Southern Idaho is less than 
200,000 with a sec number higher indicative of injuries to the dairy herd. 
*4 The DeVrles' complaints are not limited to the dairy equipment. The DeVries also allege that 
DeLaval supplied the DeVries' dairy farms with mislabeled and defective farm chemicals in order to 
fulfil DeLaval's obligation to supply chemical and ~upplies free of charge for the first year to the 
DeVrles pursuant to the terms of the Release. Chrls Rich, an employee of DeLaval, testified in his 
deposition that Delaval's General Manager, Tom Storm, had instructed him to mix expired or nearly 
expired teat dips with differing levels of iodine (a main ingredient in teat dip) in a container for 
another brand of teat tip. (Rich Depo. 51-53, Ex. A to Kurtz Aff). Mr. Storm allegedly instructed Mr. 
Rich to "dump" the expired teat dip on the DeVries. It is undisputed that the mislabeling of teat dip 
violates the Federal Food Drug & Cosmetics Act and is a misdemeanor. 21 U.S.C. § 331, et seq. 
On March 15, 2002, the DeVries informed Delaval that they had decided to purchase chemicals 
and supplies from another company because of the problems of continually high sec counts, the 
extensive teat damage, and the high incidence of mast/tis, which persisted even with the New 
Equipment. The DeVries maintain that the sec counts and the mastltis in the cows began to decrease 
and the sediment problems were reduced after they discontinued the use of DeLaval products. 
On March 28, 2002, Mr. Ramer drafted a "Milker Service Bulletin" to be sent to Delaval Dealers 
regarding the dismantling and reinstallation of certain part, Including the replacement of diaphragms 
and relocation of the milk valve, to ensure the EcoDetacher system would function properly. It does 
not appear that the DeVries waited for Delaval to upgrade their EcoDetacher system. Instead, the 
DeVries recruited Norm Zuidema of Valley Equipment Co., Inc. out of Ontario, California to come to 
the DeVries Dairy Facility to evaluate the system.00 
FN2. Mr. Zuidema had sold dairy equipment to Abe DeVries' California dairy operation. He 
has also been designated an expert witness,by the DeVrles. 
f 
Valley Equipment's first inspection revealed that the vacuum fluctuation for the Deleval equipment 
was substantially In excess of acceptable Industry maximum fluctuation standards, which resulted in 
substantially more "squawking" In that barn than would be expected of an operation that size. Mr. 
Zuidema opines that because the fluctuations in the vacuum he observed exceeded Industry 
standards to such a degree that cows milked on that system would have suffered extreme discomfort 
during the milking process. After further tests and attempts to fix the problems with the milking 
system, Valley Equipment recommended that the automation and pulsation equipment be replaced 
because Delaval had been unable to make the equipment work properly. The new equipment 
recommended by Valley Equipment was installed in March 2003. 
Furthermore, Valley Equipment recommended the Installation of a 4" stainless steel pipeline to 
replace the 3" stainless steel pipeline that was currently installed in order to allow the dairy facility to 
operate at an appropriate level. The original Purchase Agreement had provided that Delaval would 
install a 4" stainless steel pipeline. 
*S Apparently, with the installation of the 3" pipeline, the wash-up system Installed by Delaval 
did not function properly. When a wash-up system does not function properly, it is likely to cause of a 
bulld-up of bacteria in the milk system. Because of this, Valley Equipment made the decision to 
replace the wash-up system. The total cost for the work performed and the equipment supplied by 
Valley Equipment was $419,874.29. The DeVries contend that since the changes made by Valley 
Equipment, the injuries to the cows manifested by; the high somatic cell counts have steadily and 
significantly been reduced and milk production has greatly increased. 
On July 2, 2003, DeLaval sent a letter to Abraham DeVries offering to pay $51,554 as the full 
purchase price of the EcoDetachers, power supplies and pulsators. The DeVries refused the offer, 
arguing that this figure did not represent the full purchase price of the equipment installed pursuant 
to the Releases. In his deposition, Tom Storm estimated the cost of the equipment to be $90,000. 
(Storm Dep. 122:6, Ex. B to Points Aff,). Furthermore, the DeVries allege that they have suffered 
more than $1.5 million in damages caused by the defective Delaval equipment. Thus, they suggest 
damages should be the value of those claims less the amount of approximately $300,000 paid to the 
DeVries. 
II. 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
A. Standard of Review 
When reviewing a motion for summary judgmeflt, the proper inquiry is whether "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on fife, together with the affidavits, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party Is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (1993). A moving party who does not bear the burden of proof 
at trial may show that no genuine issue of material fact remains by demonstrating that "there is an 
absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party meets the requirement of Rule 
56 by showing either that no genuine Issue of material fact remains or that there is an absence of 
evidence to support the non-moving party's case, the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion 
who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine Issue for trial." Anderson v. Libertv 
Lobby, Inc .. 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). It is not enough for the 
[non-moving] party to "rest on mere allegations of denials of his pleadings." Id. Genuine factual 
issues must exist that "can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be 
resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250. 
"When determining if a genuine factual issue ... exists, ... a trial judge must bear in mind the 
actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liablllty." Id. at 249-250. "The mere 
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [defendant's] position will be insufficient; there 
must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [defendants)." Id. 
*6 The Ninth Circuit has consistently applied the standard for granting summary judgment. Musick 
v. Burke, 913 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir.1990); Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 968 F.2d 865 (9th 
Cir.1992); Bieghler v. Kleppe, 633 F.2d 531 (9th Cir.1980), 
:~ 
In determining whether a material fact exists, facts and inferences must be viewed most favorably 
to the non-moving party. To deny the motion, the Court need only conclude that a result other than 
that proposed by the moving party is possible under the facts and applicable law. Aronsen v. Crown 
Zellerbach, 662 F.2d 584, 591 (9th. Cir.1981). 
The Ninth Circuit has recently emphasized that summary judgment may not be avoided merely 
because there is some purported factual dispute, but only when there is a "genuine issue of material 
fact." Hanan v. Dataproducts Corp .• 976 F.2d 497 (9th Cjr.1992). 
In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party: 
(1) must make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine Issue of fact with respect to any element 
for which it bears the burden of proof; (2) must show that there Is an issue that may reasonably be 
resolved in favor of either party; and (3) must come forward with more persuasive evidence than 
would otherwise be necessary when the factual context makes the non-moving party's claim 
implausible. 
British Motor Car Distrib. Ltd. v. San Francisco Automotive Indus. Welfare Fund, 882 F.2d 371 (9th 
Cir.1989). 
B. Analysis , 
DeLaval moves for summary judgment on several grounds. DeLaval first argues that all but one of 
the DeVries' claims for breach of contract and strict liability are barred by the Releases executed in 
February 2001 since the problems reported by the DeVries relate to the Original Equipment Installed 
by DeLaval. Second, DeLaval argues that the DeVrles' remaining claim relating to the pulsators 
(New Equipment) is subject to DeLaval's limited warranty providing only for repair, replacement, or 
refund of the purchase price. DeLaval asserts that it offered to refund the purchase price of the New 
Equipment it installed and argues that It has satisfied its obligations under the Limited Warranty with 
respect to the pulsators. Finally, DeLaval argues that DeLaval's strict liability claim must fall because 
the DeVries only seek damages for a purely economic loss, which are barred in products liablllty 
actions sounding in tort. 
A. The DeVries argue that the releases have no legal effect. 
While DeLaval argues that all but one of the DeVries' claims for breach of contract and strict 
liability are barred by the Releases executed in February 2001, the DeVries contend that DeLaval 
fraudulently induced them into entering Into the February 2001 Releases, therefore the Releases are 
not enforceable. 
Specifically, the De Vries allege De Laval employees falsely represented that the installation of the 
New Equipment would solve the problems at the Devries Dairy Facility and that Delaval remained 
committed to making the dairy equipment function properly. Second, the DeVries argue the Releases 
should be set aside because "DeLaval failed to disclose its knowledge that the EcoDetachers did not 
function properly." (See Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 17.) 
Third, the Devries allege DeLaval intentionally delivered mislabeled teat dip after the Releases were 
signed and that "it is reasonable to infer that [Delaval] ... intended to deliver the mislabeled teat dip 
at the time it entered into the Releases." Id. In addition, the DeVries argue that Delaval "fraudulently 
concealed test results showing the dairy equipment was not functioning during and immediately 
following the installation of that equipment." Id. Finally, the DeVries allege that DeLaval failed to 
disclose that it had installed a 3" milk line before the Releases were signed, and the President of 
Delaval, Mr. Maharay, admitted that it did not intend to obtain a release from its obligation to deliver 
a 4" milk line when he signed the Release in February 2002. 
*7 Idaho courts recognize that "[a]n agreement to settle a legal dispute is a contract and its 
enforceability is governed by familiar principles of contract law. Jeff D. v. Andrus, 899 F.2d 753, 759 
(9th Clr.1989). In accordance with standard principles of contract law, a release may be set aside if 
induced by fraud, undue influence, mistake, or deceit. Mortas v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F .2d 1452 
(9th Clr.1988); see also Heath v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 89 Idaho 490,491 (1965). Thus, in order 
to survive summary judgment, the Devries must establish a genuine issue of material fact that they 
were fraudulently induced into executing the Releases for those claims based on their arguments that 
the Original Equipment, as defined in the PurchasEl Agreement, was defective. 
·1, 
Establishing a claim of fraud requires a plaintiff to prove the following elements: 
(1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; ( 4) the speaker's knowledge of Its falsity or 
ignorance of its truth; (5) the speaker's intent that it should be acted on by the person and in the 
manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) the hearer's reliance on 
the truth; (8) the hearer's right to rely thereon; and (9) the consequent and proximate injury. 
G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 518. 808 P.2d 851. 855 (1991) (citations 
omitted). A party alleging fraud must plead with particularity the factual circumstances constituting 
fraud for each of these elements. Id. Once the party alleging fraud reaches trial, it carries the burden 
of proving each element by clear and convincing evidence. Id. 
1. Representation that New Equipment Would Solve the Problems at the Dairy Operation 
The DeVries contend DeLaval fraudulently induced them into executing the February 2001 releases 
by representing that the Installation of the New Equipment would solve the problems at the Devries 
Dairy Facility and that DeLaval remained committed to making the dairy equipment function properly. 
The DeVries further contend that DeLaval never conducted any analyses or engineering study to 
determine whether the recommended changes In the dairy equipment would result in the dairy faclllty 
functioning properly as DeLaval allegedly promised; thus, Delaval had no reasonable basis for 
., 
·; 
believing the installation of the proposed equipment would solve the problems of the DeVries Dairy 
Operation. 
The Court has serious concerns whether the alleged statements made by DeLaval that it "was 
committed to making the dairy equipment work properly" and it "would do whatever was necessary to 
make that happen, no matter what it took, and no matter what the cost" may serve as a legitimate 
predicate for a claim of fraud. As a general rule, fraud cannot be based upon statements promissory 
in nature that relate to future actions or upon the mere failure to perform a promise or an agreement 
to do something in the future. Pacific States Auto. An. Corp. v. Addison, 45 Idaho 270, 261 P. 683 
(1927). The allegedly false representation must concern past or existing material facts. Moroun v. 
Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 114 P.3d 974 (2005): see also, In re Syntex Corp. Secs. 
Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 934 (9th Cir.1996) (Predictions proved to be wrong in hindsight do not render the 
statements untrue when made). Here, DeLaval's alleged statements relate to an event occurring in 
the future, and thus may not serve as a basis for fraud. 
*B The Court reaches this conclusion despite the DeVries attempt to analogize this case to G & M 
Farms v. Funk Irrig. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 1045. In G & M Farms, the plaintiff negotiated the 
purchase of an agriculture irrigation system from the defendant manufacturer and dealer. During the 
course of the negotiations, the defendant dealer made certain representations to the plaintiff that It 
would work and that they had "thousands" of these irrigations systems that had been a "great 
success" and had been operating with no customer complaints. Id. at 519, 808 P.2d at 856. While the 
trial court concluded the dealer's statements could not serve as a basis for fraud because they related 
to future events, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed, finding that the dealer's failure to disclose 
known facts relating to the flawed design and likely malfunctioning of the irrigation system fell within 
the category of intentional misrepresentation cases based on nondisclosure of material information. 
Id. at 520, 808 P.2d at 857. 
The Idaho Supreme Court based its conclusion on two indemnity agreements entered Into by the 
dealer Indicating the dealer knew the equipment ordered by the plaintiff was not designed for its 
particular farm and that the irrigation system possessed certain operational characteristics which 
might cause it to malfunction or shut down under normal conditions. At the time the plaintiff agreed 
to purchase the irrigation system, only the dealer knew of the operational and design defects and 
such defects were not readily discoverable to the plaintiff, thus giving rise to the inference that the 
parties were not dealing on equal footing. Furthermore, the court did not construe the dealer's 
statements that there were "thousands of these machines around" as mere "trade talk" or "puffing" 
because the court held that this rule does not apply when the parties are on unequal footing and 
record indicated there were only twenty-five or thirty of "these machines around" and only four of the 
precise type the plaintiff purchased-not "thousands." 
The Court does not find the circumstances in G & M Farms analogous to this case. In G & M Farms, 
the plaintiff submitted two indemnity agreements entered into by the dealer indicating it knew the 
irrigation system would not work, as well as deposition testimony concerning the extensive troubled 
history with the irrigation system purchased by the plaintiff. Conversely, in this case, the DeVries rely 
solely on the fact that DeLaval has not produced any documents demonstrating that DeLaval 
conducted any analysis or had any basis for believ;lng that it could fix the problems at the dairy. 
Simply because DeLaval did not conduct an extensive study to determine whether the recommended 
changes in the dairy equipment would ensure the proper functioning of Devries dairy facility does not 
prove that DeLaval believed its equipment would not work, or that it was reckless in believing its 
equipment would work. The DeVries were obligated to submit sufficient evidence to raise an issue of 
material fact that DeLaval had no present intention of following through on the-representations of 
which the DeVries complain at the time the statements were made in order for the statements to be 
actionable. Yet, the Devries have not submitted any evidence that DeLaval knew the new equipment 
would not solve the problems at the dairy. Nor have the DeVrles submitted any evidence that DeLaval 
did not intend to keep its alleged promise to do whatever it took and at whatever the cost to ensure 
the equipment would not work properly. For these reasons, the DeVries may not rely on these alleged 
statements of future events as a basis for their fraud claim. 
2. EcoDetachers 
*9 In addition, the DeVries predicate their claim for fraud based on the DeLaval's alleged failure to 
disclose Its knowledge that the EcoDetachers were defective. To prove that Delaval knew the 
EcoDetachers were defective, the DeVries submit an April 11, 2001 email wherein Mr. Ramer wrote to 
Mr. Storm cautioning him regarding the installation of a remote start on the EcoDetachers being 
installed at the DeVries dairy facil!ty. Specifically, Nr. Ramer wrote in the email, "Universal has never 
design[ed] an option for a remote start circuit for an EcoDetacher in a parlor. There are a number of 
design steps that must be taken prior to this work' being done ... [f]ailure to take these steps almost 
insures there will be problems later." (See Kurtz Aff, Ex. D, Ex. 18.) 
Then, on June 13, 2001, Mr. Storm wrote an email to Bill Thompson stating the DeVries were 
having problems with the EcoDetachers and that he was informed that morning by Mr. Ramer that 
"this was riot a new problem ... and that it had been going on for 3-4 months." FN3 (Kurtz Aff, Ex. D, 
Ex. 16.) Mr. Storm continued, "Devries hit us real hard this morning about premature failure on the 
units already there [sic] comment was 'this is what we expected' .... It would have been nice if 
someone could have gave us some warning of this problem before we were blind sided out at this 
particular dairy." Id. The Installation of the EcoDetachers was completed in July 2001. Nearly a year 
later, on March 28, 2002, after the DeVries had employed another company to fix the milking system, 
Mr. Ramer distributed a "Milker Service Bulletin" to all DeLaval dealers regarding the dismantling and 
reinstallation of certain parts to "upgrade" the EcoDetacher system so that It would function properly. 
FN3. The importance of the email which mentioned problems with the EcoDetachers 
going back 3 or 4 months is that this would put Delaval on notice of possible problems 
with the equipment as early as February 13/March 13, 2001. The Releases were executed 
on February 28, 2001. 
In response, DeLaval maintains that only after;the Releases were signed did its employees realize 
that they may encounter problems with the EcoDe,tachers at the OeVries' dairy facility. Steve Ramer 
testified that he probably was the first person to tiecome aware of the problems with the 
EcoOetachers when he began receiving some calli;; from dealers. Ramer further testified that when 
DeLaval begins receiving complaints regarding its equipment, it follows a certain process to determine 
If the problem is systemic or restricted to a few Isolated instances. During the course of this process, 
DeLaval checks the numbers on the warranty to confirm how many complaints regarding the 
equipment It had actually received. Then it performs tests on the equipment and contacts the supplier 
to try to determine the exact nature of the problem. Thus, according to Mr. Ramer, it can take 3-4 
months to ascertain whether a significant problem with the equipment actually exists. 
In the Court's estimation, the OeVries have failed to show that DeLaval knew the EcoDetachers 
were defective when they signed the Releases. In fact, Ramer testified he believed the EcoDetachers 
would work properly at the Devries dairy facility. Furthermore, DeLaval was able to effectively and 
promptly remedy the problem by replacing each of the diaphragms, which were causing the 
problems. Because there is not sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether OeLaval knew the EcoDetachers would not work at the time it signed the Releases, the 
Devries may not rely upon the subsequent problems with the EcoDetacher as a basis for their claim of 
fraudulent inducement. 
3. Installed 3" as opposed to 4" Milk Line 
*10 The DeVries next argue that OeLaval fraudulently concealed the installation of the 3n milk line 
when the original Purchase Agreement required tl')e installation of a 4" milk line at the DeVries Dairy. 
Tom Storm admitted that he knew that only a 3!' i;nilk line had been installed at the Devries Dairy 
Facility before he signed the February 2001 Releases. According to the DeVries, Instead of informing 
the OeVries of this fact and attempting to correct the problem, Tom Storm engaged in a "cover-up" 
and attempted to convince the DeVrles that the removal of the ALPro system and the installation of 
the EcoDetachers was all that was needed to correct the problems at the DeVries Dairy Facility. 
The Court agrees that the February 2001 Release should not apply to any claim regarding the milk 
line, assuming the truth of the DeVrles' allegations that Delaval failed to disclose it had installed a 3" 
milk lln.e rather than the 4" milk Jlne. Devries had a right to rely on DeLaval's nondisclosure when it 
agreed to release any claims regarding the milk line. However, the DeVrles may not rely upon 
DeLaval's nondisclosure regarding Its Installation of a 3" milk line rather than a 4" milk line as a basis 
for invalidating the Releases in their entirety. 
4. Mislabeled Teat Dip 
The DeVrles also contend DeLaval fraudulently supplied mislabeled teat dip-an udder hygiene 
product used to sanitize the cow's teats i:rrior to aliJd after milking, which is used to kill bacteria and 
prevent mastitis and is crucial to a dairy operation'. As part of the Release agreement, DeLaval agreed 
to supply farm chemicals, including teat dip, to the DeVries without charge for a period of one year. 
The record suggests Tom Storm, DeLaval's General Manager, ordered Chris Rich, an employee, to 
deliver to the Devries 250 gallons of teat dip that had expired and was mislabeled in violation of the 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331. Specifically, Mr. Rich testified that Mr. Storm 
told him, "[t]his stuff you are going to have a hard time selling. Just take it out to the DeVrles' and 
dump it." (See Kurtz Aff., Ex. A, 52:6-23.) 
Mr. Rich contacted Bill Vandersluis, the District Sales Manager for DeLaval during the relevant time 
period, to inform him that he had been Instructed to deliver and did deliver mislabeled and expired 
teat dip. Mr. Vandersluis failed to convey this information to the DeVries and Mr. Vanersluls conceded 
this failure was "not the right thing to do." (Id. 46:9-12.) 
While the Court agrees that Mr. Storm's conduct, If true, is especially egregious, it does not 
necessarily agree with the DeVries' contention that It Is reasonable to infer that Mr. Storm planned to 
"dump" mislabeled and expired teat dip when he signed the Releases. Therefore, the DeVries cannot 
use this alleged conduct as a basis for their claim that there were fraudulently induced into entering 
the Releases. 
5. Pulsators 
Finally, the Devries argue Delaval fraudulently concealed the results of the test conducted by Mr. 
Hipwell indicating that the pulsators were not functioning properly. On June 14, 2001, before Delaval 
had completed the Installation of the Ect>Detachers, DeLaval sent Jeff Durkin, the in-house 
veterinarian, to test the DeVries dairy equipment. 'The DeVries allege that Mr. Durkin reported that 
the equipment was functioning properly and the DeVries suggest Mr. Durkin should have informed the 
DeVries of the new Information Mr. Storm had acquired from Mr. Ramer in the June 13, 2001 email 
regarding the problems with the EcoDetachers. During this same time period, DeLaval's employee, 
Jim Hipwell, ran several tests which allegedly revealed that the equipment was fluctuating beyond 
acceptable levels that could result in physical damage to the dairy cows' teats. However, Mr. Hipwell 
purportedly did not notify the DeVrles of the test results, but instead attributed the problems to the 
Devries dairy practices. 
* l l Essentially, the De Vries seem to argue that Mr. HipweU's failure to Inform them of the 
problems with the pulsators, as well as DeLaval's furnishing them with mislabeled teat dip, was part 
of Delaval's ongoing fraud to convince the DeVrles that It had evaluated the problems at the DeVries' 
dairy, identified the problems, and knew which remedy would work. However, all of this conduct 
occurred after the Releases were signed on February 28, 2001 and cannot serve as a basis for 
fraudulent inducement to execute the Releases. 
B. Limited Warranty 
DeLaval next argues any claim relating to the New Equipment Is subject to the provisions of 
DeLaval's limited warranty, which limits remedies for complaints about the equipment to repair, 
replacement or refund of the purchase price. Delaval maintains it has satisfied its obligation under 
the limited warranty with its offer to pay the DeVrles the amount of $51,554 for the full purchase 
price of the New Equlpment.B'14 The DeVries, how~ver, respond that Delaval's attempt to limit the 
remedy for the delivery of the defective equipment to repair and replacement or return of the 
purchase price failed of Its essential purpose. As a result of this purported failure, the DeVries argue 
they are entitled to all the remedies for breach of contract allowed under the Uniform Commercial 
Code despite the separate provision precluding the recovery of any damages, whether direct, indirect, 
or consequential. FNS 
FN4. Delaval contend that It has expended in excess of $576,000 in direct payments, 
materials, and equipment to satisfy the DeVries' concerns over the dairy equipment. 
FN5. The text of the Limited Warranty reads as follows: 
EXCLUSION OF OTHER WARRANTIES 
Other than this Limited Warranty*** DELAVAL AND SELLER MAKE NO OTHER 
WARRANTY FOR THE EQUIPMENT OR Tl;IE SYSTEM IN WHICH IT IS USED, 
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUl\ NOT LIMITED TO THE IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE 
EXCLUSION OF OTHER REMEDIES 
THE REMEDIES SET OUT ABOVE ARE THE DAIRY PRODUCER'S (AND IF 
DIFFERENT, DAIRY OWNER'S) EXCLUSIVE REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF THIS 
LIMITED WARRANTY. IN NO EVENT SHALL DAIRY PRODUCER {OR DAIRY 
OWNER) BE ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES OF ANY KIND, WHETHER DIRECT, 
INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO DAMAGES 
. DUE TO DELAYS IN DELIVERY, LOSS OF PRODUCTION, LOSS OF PROFIT, LOSS 
OF PREMIUMS, EXCESS CULLING, INCREASED COSTS OF OPERATION, AND LOSS 
OF, INJURY TO, OR ILLNESS OF LIVESTOCK) IN EXCESS OF THE PURCHASE 
PRICE REFUND REMEDY SET OUT ABOVE. 
1. Failure of its Essential Purpose 
A seller of a product may limit its warranty obligation to the repair and replacement of defective 
parts. See r.c. § 28-2-719(1)(a). However, Idaho/Code§ 28-2-719(2) further provides "where 
circumstances cause an exclusive or limited reme1y to fall of Its essential purpose, remedy may be 
had as provided In this act." An exclusive repair or replacement remedy is meant to ensure that a 
purchaser receives a product free from defects, and if it becomes evident during the warranty period 
that the product is defective, this triggers the seller's obligation to cure the defective product within a 
reasonable time. See Clark v. Int'/ Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 340, 581 P.2d 784, 798 (1978); see 
also I.C. s 28-2-309(1). "If, however, the seller is subsequently unable or unwilling to repair or 
replace a defective part within a reasonable time, the buyer is left with a defective product not 
conforming to the warranty and the limited remedy has not achieved its purpose." Clark, 99 Idaho at 
340, 581 P.2d at 798. Proof of negligent or wilful dilatory conduct is not required under Idaho Code § 
28-2-719(2); rather, the section applies even In circumstances where an exclusive remedy seemed 
fair and reasonable when the contract was executed, "but as a result of later circumstances operates 
to deprive a party of a substantial benefit of the bargain." Id. (citing I.C. § 28-2-719, Official 
Comment 1). Conversely, a plaintiff must also act in good faith to provide a defendant with a 
reasonable time to repair or replace defective parts. Clark, 99 Idaho at 340, 581 P.2d at 798. 
*:t.2 Here, although Delaval limited its warranty obligation to repairing or replacing defective 
parts, If the milking equipment was defective a'nd DeLaval failed to cure those defects within a 
reasonable time after being afforded an opportunity to do so, it would seem the Devries would be 
entitled to pursue their general remedies under thll UCC pursuant to I.C. § 28-2-719(2). The Court 
finds a question of fact exists as to whether the New Equipment provided to the DeVrles was defective 
at the time it was delivered and installed in the DeVries' dairy farms, and, If so, whether Delaval was 
able to cure those defects within a reasonable time. 
2. Damages 
However, this does not necessarily end the inquiry. Assuming the De Vries are able to prove at trial 
that the warranty to repair or replace defective parts failed of its essential purpose, the issue remains 
as to what effect the failure of the limited warranty has on the other contractual provisions excluding 
liability for all other damages. As noted above, the DeVries suggest that the failure of the limited 
warranty automatically entitles them to "the full array of remedies provided by the ucc, including the 
recovery of consequential and incidental damages." Clark. 99 Idaho at 342 (citing I.C. § 28-2-714 
and § 715). However, the Clark court also recognized that in certain commercial contexts, "the failure 
of an exclusive remedy does not automatically require disregard of other limitations on liability 
provided by the agreement." Id. 
In Clark, the plaintiff purchased a tractor for his custom farming business. In the plaintiff's first 
year of owning the tractor, several breakdowns in the tractor's engine occurred. Under the warranty, 
the defendant seller repaired the prol:>lems free of charge. Id. at 330. 581 P.2d at 788. A year and a 
half after purchasing the tractor, the plaintiff noticed a loss of power in the tractor, which prevented 
him from working the fall season with Its poor fleltil conditions and he was only able to work the 
tractor on a limited basis in the spring. Id. When tjhe defendants failed to remedy the plaintiff's 
problems with the tractor, the plaintiff flied a claim against the defendants for negligent design and 
manufacture and breach of Implied and express warranties. Id. With respect to the breach of 
warranty claim, the plaintiff argued the exclusive remedy of repair and replacement of defective parts 
failed of its essential purpose as a result of defendant's failure to repair the tractor in a reasonable 
time. Id. at 338, 581 P.2d at 796. 
The Clark court found a genuine issue of material fact existed whether the defendants failed to 
cure the tractor's defect within a reasonable time. The court, however, did not end its inquiry there. 
Rather, the court considered whether the contractual provision excluding liability for incidental and 
consequential damages would still be enforceable assuming the failure of the repair or replacement 
remedy to achieve Its purpose. Id. at 341, 581 P.2d at 799. To decide this question, the Clark court 
looked to the applicable UCC provisions, as well as to the decisions of other courts, which had also 
considered this same issue. In conducting this review, the Clark court commented, "[t]he majority of 
the courts in cases involving the failure of an exclusive remedy contained in a warranty provision 
which also excludes liability for consequential damages have ruled that the provisions limiting liability 
fail also and that the plaintiffs are entitled to the full array of remedies provided by the UCC, including 
the recovery of consequential and incidental damages." Id. Courts reaching this conclusion reason 
that sellers " 'cannot at once repudiate their obligation under their warranty and assert Its provisions 
beneficial to them.'" Id. (quoting Adams v .. J.I. Case Co., 261 N.E.2d (1970); see also Jones & 
McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp .• 320 F.Supp. 39 (N.D.!11.1970). 
*13 Before applying this reasoning to the facts of that case, the Clark court also noted that other 
courts have distinguished this line of cases of ndt'\:1llowing the defendant seller to shelter itself behind 
the provisions in a warranty, when allegedly repudiating its limited obligations under the same 
warranty. For example, in Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp .• 418 F.Supp. 435 
(S.D.N.Y.1976), the court upheld a contractual provision limiting liability for consequential damages 
despite an alleged fallure of the exclusive repair or replacement warranty to achieve Its purpose. 418 
F.Supp. at 458. In Westinghouse, the Court felt that a better approach would be to ignore the 
exclusive remedy clause in the case of its failure "while other clauses limiting remedies In less drastic 
manners and on different theories would be left to stand or fall independently of the stricken clause." 
Id. at 457 (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In adopting this approach for that case, 
the Westinghouse court found no reason to disturb the consensual allocatlon of business risk 
embodied In the contract, especially in an agreement that was painstakingly negotiated between two 
industrial giants over two years, involving "a highly complex, sophisticated, and in some ways 
experimental piece of equipment." The Westinghouse court also found the fact that the plaintiff was 
still entitled to recover the price of the equipment pursuant to a separate provision in the contract 
particularly significant; thus, even If the repair and remedy failed entirely, the plaintiff was at least 
left with a minimum adequate recovery. 
The Clark court, however, distinguished Westinghouse from the case pending before It, reasoning 
that the tractor was not a highly complex or experimental piece of equipment, but a standardized 
piece of farm equipment, "which the plaintiffs wer~ fully entitled to expect would be delivered to them 
free of defects which could not be cured within a reasonable tlme." Furthermore, the Clark court 
noted there was a significant disparity between the parties and the terms of the contract were 
contained in printed form and not the result of painstaking negotiations. For these reasons, the Clark 
court concluded: 
Under these circumstances a seller who fails to comply with its obligations under the warranty, 
such as the repair or replacement duties, cannot receive the benefit of the other provisions, which in 
part at least were premised on the assumption that the seller would fulfill Its obligations. The failure 
of the limited remedy in this case would materially alter the balance of risk set by the parties in the 
agreement. In such a situation, we conclude that the other limitations and exclusions on the seller's 
warranties and liability must be disregarded and that the general provisions of the UCC should govern 
the rights of the parties. · 
Id. at 343-44, 584 P.2d at 801-02. 
The question the Court must answer in this case Is whether the circumstances here more closely 
resemble those in Clark or those In Westinghouse. In asking this question, the Court may also 
examine the remedy provisions to determine whether DeLaval's alleged default caused a loss to the 
DeVries which was not part of the bargained-for allocatlon of risk. Here, the dairy equipment is 
arguably more complex than the tractor In Clark. However, it does not amount to the highly complex, 
sophisticated, and in some ways experimental piece of equipment involved in Westinghouse. And, 
while not unsophisticated, the DeVrles hardly amount to an industrial giant. Yet, DeLaval also agreed 
to refund the purchase price of the New Equipme~t in the case of default, and, thus, the DeVries are 
not left without a remedy. Nonetheless, the Court(finds the facts of this case more analogous to Clark 
than Westinghouse. Therefore, the Court recommends that the DeVries be able to pursue their 
available remedies under the UCC pursuant to LC.§ 28-2-719(2) If they are able to prove that the 
limited warranty failed of its essential purpose, 
c. Strict Liability 
*:14 DeLaval also moves summary judgment with respect to the DeVries· claim for strict liability 
on the basis that the DeVrles seek recovery of purely economic loss. 
While a manufacturer may be held liable for "physical harm" to person or property caused by its 
defective product, a manufacturer's liability does not extend to encompass purely economic loss. See, 
e.g. Clark v. Int'/ Harvester Co .• 99 Idaho 326. 333. 581 P.2d 784, 791 (1978). "[A] contrary rule, 
which would allow compensation for losses of economic advantage caused by the defendant's 
negligence [or defective product], would Impose too heavy and unpredictable a burden on the 
defendant's conduct." See, e.g.,. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Contr. Co., Inc., 99 Idaho 462, 468, 583 
P.2d 997. 1003 (1978). The Idaho Supreme Court further articulated the rationale for the economic 
loss doctrine, quoting Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9. 45 Cal.Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965), 
as follows: 
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical injuries and warranty 
recovery for economic Joss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the 'luck' of one plaintiff in having an 
accident causing physical injury. The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of 
the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake[in distributing his products. He can appropriately be 
held liable for physical Injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods to match a standard of safety 
defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be held for the level 
of performance of his products in the consumer's business unless he agrees that the product was 
designed to meet the consumer's demands. A consumer should not be charged at the will of the 
manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on the market. He can, 
however, be fairly charged with the risk that the product will not match his economic expectations 
unless the manufacturer agrees that it will. Even In actions for negligence, a manufacturer's liability is 
limited to damages for physical injuries and there is no recovery for economic loss alone. (Citations 
omitted). 
Clark, 99 Idaho at 334. 581 P.2d at 792, quoting Seely. 45 Cal.Rptr. at 23, 403 P.2d at 151. 
In the context of the economic loss doctrine, the Idaho Supreme Court defines "economic loss" 
includes "costs of repair and replacement of defective property which Is the subject of the transaction, 
as well as the commercial loss for Inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use, Salmon 
River Sportsman Camps. Inc. v. Cessna Aircra~ C~., 97 Idaho 348, 351, 544 P.2d 306, 309 (1975), 
while "property loss" Includes "damage to propertV other than which Is the subject of the transaction." 
Id. -
The Devries attempt to circumvent the economic loss doctrine by asserting that the DeLaval 
equipment caused substantial property damage to the Devries' dairy herd. The Court, however, 
believes this issue was properly resolved in Myers v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products. Inc., 114 Idaho 
432,432, 757 P.2d 695, 697 (ct.App.1988). In Myers, the plaintiffs purchased a feed storage and 
delivery system, which consisted of a silo and power-operated unloading unit, from the defendant 
seller and defendant manufacturer. The silo failed to function as promised and the hay stored in the 
silo deteriorated and the plaintiffs' combined dairy herd began to suffer from decreased milk 
production. The plaintiffs sought help from the defendant seller but the seller was unable to cure the 
defects. The plaintiffs then filed an action against defendants for, inter alia, negligence and strict 
liability. In affirming the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of defendants as 
to negligence and strict liability, the Myers court noted that the plaintiffs had not "plead any specific 
damages due to losses In the feed or cattle value." Id. at 436, 757 P.2d at 699. Because "[t)he losses 
suffered as a result of feed deterioration and cattle illness were manifested by Income changes 
brought on by reduced milk production, the court held that the defendants were not liable to plaintiffs 
in negligence or strict liability as the plaintiffs' claims were for economic losses properly addressed as 
predicated upon. contract claims rather than as tort claims. Id. 
* 15 Despite the DeVries' best efforts to distinguish Myers from the circumstances of this case, the 
Court finds the facts of Myers strikingly analogous the facts of this case. As in Myers, the damages to 
the cattle in this case arose from the failure of the, product to match the buyers' commercial 
expectations and were manifested by lost profits Eind consequential business losses resulting from 
alleged failures of the mllking equipment and decreased milk production. And as in Myers, although 
the DeVries did allege property damage of a sort, the essence of their claim is the loss of a 
contractual benefit of a properly functioning milking system In addition to consequential damages. 
"When a loss results from mere product Ineffectiveness, It Is the law of contracts and commercial 
transactions, rather than strict products liability, which fixes responsibility for the loss. Myers, 114 
Idaho at 436, 757 P.2d at 699 (quoting Purvis v. Consolidated Energy Products Co., 674 F.2d 217, 
223 (4th Cir.1982). Therefore, as the Idaho Court of Appeals held in Myers, the Court finds these 
economic losses may be properly addressed as predicated upon the contract claims, not in tort. 
III. 
Motion to Amend 
The DeVries seek to amend the Complaint to add a claim for punitive damages. Idaho law permits 
an amendment to add a claim for punitive damages when the plaintiff has established a reasonable 
likelihood of proving facts at trial that the defendant acted in a manner that was an extreme deviation 
from reasonable standards of conduct and that the act was performed by the defendant with an 
understanding of or disregard for its likely consequences. Weaver v. Staford, 134 Idaho 691. 700, 8 
/ 
' } 
P.3d 1234, 1243 (2000). The justification of punitive damages must be that the defendant acted 
with an extremely harmful state of mind, whether that be termed "mallce, oppression, fraud or gross 
negligence1'; "malice, oppression, wantonness"; or simply "deliberate or wilful." Highland Enters., Inc. 
v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 348~349. 986 P.2d 996, 1014-15 (199~J. Therefore, to support a motion to 
add punitive damages under I.C. § 6-1604, the OeVries must establish a reasonable likelihood they 
could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that DeLaval acted oppressively, fraudulently, 
wantonly, maliciously or outrageously. See Vaught v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 131 Idaho 357, 362, 956 
P.2d 674. 679 (1998). The Idaho courts have defined malice as the general disregard for the truth or 
falsity of a statement. Stafford, 134 Idaho at 700, 8 P.3 d at 1243. 
The Court finds that the DeVries have established a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trlal 
sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. If the OeVries are able to prove at trial that 
DeLaval deliberately delivered mislabeled and expired teat dip ln violation of the law, and deliberately 
concealed that it had Installed a 3" milk line rather than a 411 milk line in violation of the terms of the 
original purchase agreement, this would constitute an extreme deviation from reasonable standards 
of conduct and justify an award for punitive damages·. 
*l6 However, by recommending that the amendment be allowed does not automatically translate 
into allowing the matter to be presented to the jury. The trial court will be in the best position to 
evaluate whether the jury should be instructed as to punitive damages after It has heard all of the 
testimony at the trial. The Court would further recommend that even if the issue of punitive damages 
Is to be presented at the trial, that the trial court c;onsider bifurcating that issue from liability and 
other damages. :, 
RECOMMENDATION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises, IT IS HEREBY 
RECOMMENDED that: 
1) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 23), flied on January 5, 2006, be 
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 
2) Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend/Correct to Add Claim for Punitive Damages (Docket No. 32), filed on 
January 6, 2006, be GRANTED. 
Written objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within ten (10) days pursuant 
to 28 u.s.c. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.l(b), or as a result of failing to do so, that party may 
waive the right to raise factual and/or legal objections to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. 
D.Idaho,2006. 
Devries v. DeLaval, Inc. 
Slip Copy, 2006 WL 1582179 {D.Idaho), 60 UCC ~ep.Serv.2d 154 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
LARRY M. BOYLE;, District Judge. 
*l Currently pending before the Court is Guy Carpenter's Motion for Summary Judgment Against 
GF & C's Claims (Docket No. 37). Having carefully reviewed the record, considered oral arguments, 
and otherwise being fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum Decision and Order. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff General Fire & Casualty Co. ("General Fire" or "GenFlre") is an Idaho insurance company, 
wholly owned by Plaintiff GF & C (collectively "Plaintiffs"), an Idaho holding company. Graham Deel., 
'!I'll 2-3 (Docket No. 32, Att. 3). Defendant Guy Carpenter & Co., Inc. ("Defendant" or "Guy 
Carpenter") is a reinsurance intermediary Incorporated in Delaware with offices in Washington, among 
other places. Id. at 'II 4. 
Reinsurance Is "insurance for Insurance companies." An insurance company, known in the industry 
as a primary or ceding company, cedes portions of its liability on risks to another Insurance company, 
known as a reinsurer, to reduce the amount of possible loss incurred by the ceding company. 
Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, ,i 3 (Docket No. 36, Att. 1). Reinsurance Is used because state statutes 
require Insurers to maintain a certain ratio of policyholder surplus in relation to the amount of risk 
assumed by the insurer. Graham Deel., ,i 6 (Docket No. 32, Att. 3). 
Reinsurance Intermediaries like Guy Carpenter :act as the middlemen between ceding Insurers and 
reinsurers. Id. at 'II 7, "A reinsurance Intermediary assists the cedant to draw up a reinsurance 
program and then goes to the reinsurer 'market' to propose the cedant's terms, negotiate with 
relnsurers, and finalize the terms of the reinsurance agreements." Id. 
General Fire commenced writing property/casualty insurance policies In January 1999. Crandall 
Affidavit, 'II 5 (Docket No. 36, Att. 2). Guy Carpenter acted as the reinsurance intermediary for 
General Fire from 1999 until May 2005. Graham Deel., ,i 8 (Docket No. 32, Att. 3). GF & C alleges 
that Guy Carpenter provides services for it as well. GF & C's Response to Motion for Summary 
Judgment Against GF & C's Claims, p. 3 (Docket No. 42). 
Each year from 1999 to 2003, Guy Carpenter designed reinsurance programs that provided excess 
of loss ("XOL") reinsurance for General Fire policyholder claims in excess of a $1 million working layer 
of reinsurance (where most of General Fire's claims were expected to occur). Crandall Afidavlt, ,i 9 
(Docket No. 36, Att. 2). Guy Carpenter recommended that General Fire purchase XOL reinsurance for 
casualty losses in blocks that provide coverage up to an aggregate limit of $4 million in any one year, 
with one or more "reinstatements" depending on the year. Id. 
Each of the casualty XOL reinsurance contracts prepared by Guy Carpenter contains a 
reinstatement clause that provides for reinstatement of the excess coverage in return for payment of 
additional premium to the relnsurers. Id. at ,i 10. General Fire understood that it would be required to 
pay a reinstatement premium to reinstate each successive layer of XOL coverage. Id. However, 
allegedly, there was a misunderstanding as to the nature and timing of the reinstatement premium 
obligations. Id. Based on Guy Carpenter's Loss Scenarios and general discussions, General Fire 
allegedly understood that it could elect to reinstate the XOL reinsurance coverage in exchange for 
payment of the reinstatement premium if and when it determined that it needed the additional 
reinsurance coverage. Id. at ,i 11. However, in late 2003, when General Fire contacted Guy Carpenter 
to ask advice on whether it could exercise its right to reinstate the limits of coverage any time as the 
losses developed or Instead must do so prior to the end of the 2003 accident year, it learned that 
reinstatement and reinstatement premiums were automatic, not optional elections. Id. at ,i 15; Dec. 
30, 2003, E-mail (Bates Nos. GFC06177-79), Ex. 7 to Crandall Affidavit, pp. 1·3 (Docket No. 36, Att. 
9). Specifically, Guy Carpenter advised General Fire as follows: 
*2 Reinstatement is not optional-It is automatic and there is an accompanyJng charge for It. The 
reinstatement premium is due when the loss Is paid and Is usually netted against the paid loss 
amount .... 
One way to illustrate reinstatement is you start the year with a bucket filled with water. You dip 
into it (pay a loss), and the relnsurer immediately fills it back up so you still have a full bucket to deal 
with the next loss (simultaneously you pay him additional premium for the extra water he topped you 
off with). 
Crandall Affidavit, ,i 16 (Docket No. 36, Att. 2); May 28, 2004, E-mail (Bates Nos. GFC10404-09), 
Ex. 7 to Crandall Affidavit, pp. 4-9 (Docket No. 36, Att. 9). This advice was accompanied by specific 
numerical examples showing, allegedly for the first time, that for every dollar paid to General Fire by 
Its reinsurers to cover a loss under the initial 4xl layer of coverage, the reinsurers would offset or 
deduct from that payment the amount of premium required to reinstate the coverage whether or not 
General Fire needed or wanted the reinstatement at that time. Crandall Affidavit, ,i 16 (Docket No. 
36, Att. 2). 
After receiving this advice, General Fire asked its auditors to consider the effect of Guy Carpenter's 
Interpretation of the reinstatement provision of the 4xl XOL reinsurance contracts. Id. at ,i 17. The 
auditors concluded that the relevant contract language was ambiguous. Id. Nonetheless, they 
required General Fire to accrue for reinstatement premiums in the Company's 2003 financial 
statements, allegedly resulting in an approximately $1.8 million reduction in earnings due to 
increased reinsurance expenses for 2003. Id. 
II, 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On November 30, 2004, General Fire filed, in state court, its Complaint against Guy Carpenter, 
bringing the following counts: negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and 
misrepresentation. Complaint, pp. 4-13 (Docket No. 1, Att, 1), 
On June 24, 2005, Guy Carpenter removed the action to the United States District Court. Notice of 
Removal (Docket No. 1). 
On August 10, 2005, General Fire filed a first Amended Complaint (Docket No. 11), adding the 
following counts: constructive fraud (count five) and unjust enrichment and disgorgement (count six). 
First Amended Complaint, pp. 10-12 (Docket No. 11). 
On August 31, 2005, the parties filed a Stipulated Motion for Leave to Amend and to Extend Time 
to File Answer or Responsive Motion (Docket No. 12), which the Court granted, Order Granting 
Stipulated Motion for Leave to Amend and to Extend Time to File Answer or Responsive Motion 
(Docket No. 13). Therefore, on September 14, 2005, General Fire filed its Second Amended 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial {Docket No. 14), in which GF & c was included as a plaintiff and 
which listed the counts as follows: negligence (count one); negligent misrepresentation (count two); 
breach of fiduciary duty (count three); breach of contract (count four); misrepresentation (count 
five); constructive fraud (count six); and forfeiture, disgorgement, and/or constructive trust (count 
seven).FN1 
FNl. Plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (Docket No. 
52) on July 20, 2006, for the purpose of articulating that the amount in controversy in 
this action exceeds $75,000, such that the exercise of diversity jurisdiction is 
appropriate. The Third Amended Complaint contains the same counts as the Second 
Amended Complaint. 
*3 On July 18, 2006, the Court heard oral argument on the currently-pending motion, as well as 
on other motions. Minute Entry (Docket No. 56). Following the hearing, the Court dismissed the 
negligent misrepresentation claim and granted GF & C's Rule 56(f) motion. Order and Notice of 
Continued Hearing, p. 10 (Docket No. 58). Accordingly, the hearing was continued until October 30, 
2006, to permit "additional discovery and briefing" in the interim. Id. That has now happened, and 
the case has been submitted for the Court's decision. 
III, 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG~ENT AGAINST GF & C'S CLAIMS 
On May 26, 2006, Guy Carpenter filed Its Motion for Summary Judgment Against GF & C's Claims 
(Docket No. 37), arguing (1) that Idaho's "economic-loss rule" bars GF & C's recovery in its 
negligence claims because It seeks purely economic damages and because neither of the two limited 
exceptions to the rule apply and (2) that GF & C's other claims must fail because Guy Carpenter never 
agreed to perform any services or assume any duties at all in regard to GF & C. Guy Carpenter's 
Memorandum in Support, pp. 5-7 (Docket No. 37, Att. 1), GF & C opposes the motion, GF & C's 
Memorandum in Opposition (Docket No. 42). 
A. Summary Judgment Standard 
Motions for summary judgment are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which 
provides, in pertinent part, that judgment "shall be rendered forthwith If the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, If any, show that there 
Is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Fed.R.Clv.P. 56{c). 
1. Genuine Issue of Material Fact 
According to Rule 56, an Issue must be both "material" and "genuine" to preclude entry of 
summary judgment. An issue is "material" if it affects the outcome of the litigation. Hahn v. Sargent, 
523 F.2d 461. 464 (1st Cir.1975). That is, a material fact is 
one that is relevant to an element of a claim or defense and whose existence might affect the 
outcome of the suit. The materiality of a fact is thus determined by the substantive law governing the 
claim or defense. Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary 
judgment. 
T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626. 630 (9th Cir.1987) (citing 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc .• 477 U.S. 242 (1986)), 
On the other hand, an issue is "genuine" when there is "sufficient evidence supporting the claimed 
factual dispute ... to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at 
trial." Hahn, 523 F.2d at 464 (quoting First Nat'/ Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co .• 391 U.S. 253, 289 
(1968)). Because factual disputes are to be resolved at trial, in ruling on summary judgment motions, 
the Court does not resolve conflicting evidence with respect to disputed material facts, nor does it 
make credibility determinations. T. W. E/ec. Serv .• Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. Moreover, all inferences 
must be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 631. 
2. Moving and Nonmoving Parties' Burdens 
*4 The initial burden Is on the moving party to show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of Jaw. See Steck/ v. 
Motorola. Inc., 703 F.2d 392. 393 (9th Cir.19831: Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). If the moving party meets its 
initial burden, the nonmoving party must "produce 'specific facts showing that there remains a 
genuine factual issue for trial' and evidence 'significantly probative' as to any [material) fact claimed 
to be disputed." Steck/, 703 F.2d at 393 (quoting Rufin v. County of L.A .• 607 F.2d 1276. 1280 (9th 
Clr.1979)). In addition, the nonmovlng party must make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element that is essential to the party's case and upon which the party will bear the 
burden of proof at trial; otherwise, summary judgment Is required. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 322 {1986). If the nonmoving party fails to make such a showing on any essential element of 
the nonmoving party's case, "there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete 
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all 
other facts immaterial." Id. at 323. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(el.W So, to withstand a motion for 
summary judgment, a nonmovlng party 
FN2. Rule 56(e) states that, In responding to a motion for summary judgment,an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, 
but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trlal. If the adverse party 
does not so respond, summary judgment, If appropriate, shall be entered against the 
adverse party. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). 
(1) must make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact with respect to any element 
for which It bears the burden of proof; (2) must show that there Is an issue that may reasonably be 
resolved in favor of either party; and (3) must come forward with more persuasive evidence than 
would otherwise be necessary when the factual context makes the non-moving party's claim 
implausible. 
British Motor Car Distribs., Ltd. v. S.F. Auto. Indus. Welfare Fund, 883 F.2d 371, 374 {9th 
Cir.1989) (citation omitted). 
In recent years, the Supreme Court, "by clarifying what the non-moving party must do to 
withstand a motion for summary judgment, has Increased the utility of summary judgment." Cal. 
Architectural Bldg. Prods .• Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics. Inc .• 818 F.2d 1466. 1468 (9th Cir.1987). 
Therefore, "[n]o longer can it be argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact 
precludes the use of summary judgment." Id. Nonetheless, "If a rational trier of fact might resolve the 
issue In favor of the nonmovlng party, summary judgment must be denied." T. W. Elec. Serv .• Inc .• 
809 F.2d at 631; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc .• 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (holding a motion for 
summary judgment must be denied when the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the nonmovlng party"). 
B. GF & C's Negligence Claims and Idaho's Economic-Loss Rule 
In Idaho, unless an exception applies, the economic-loss rule prohibits recovery of purely 
economic losses in a negligence action because there is no duty to prevent economic loss to another. 
Blahd v. Richard B. Smith. Inc .• 141 Idaho 296, 300, 108 P.3d 996, 1000 (2005) (citing Duffin v. 
Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n. 126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200 (1995). In this case, as 
to GF & C's negligence claims, it is undisputed that GF & C seeks recovery purely for economic losses. 
Guy Carpenter's Memorandum in Support, p. 9 (Docket No. 37, Att. 1) (citing Second Amended 
Complaint, ,i 32 (Docket No. 14) and contending that "GF & C alleges purely economic damages 
only," a contention GF & Chas not denied). Therefore, GF & C's negligence claims are barred unless 
an exception to the economic-loss rule applies. 
*5 There are two exceptions to the economic-loss rule: the existence of a special relationship 
between the parties and unique circumstances requiring a reallocation of the risk. Millenkamp v. 
Davisco Foods Int'/. Inc., 391 F.Supp.2d 872, 878 (D.Idaho 2005). 
! 
1. Special Relationship 
A "special relationship" refers to situations in which the relationship between the parties is such 
that it would be equitable to impose a duty to prevent economic loss to another. Id. It is an 
"extremely limited group of cases where the law of negligence extends its protections to a party's 
economic interest." Id. (quoting Blahd. 141 Idaho at 301, 108 P.3d at 1001 (quoting Duffin. 126 
Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201)). The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized two situations in which 
the "special relationship" exception applies: (1) where an entity holds itself out to the public as 
having expertise regarding a specialized function and knowingly induces reliance on its performance 
of that function and (2) where a professional or quasi-professional performs personal services. 
M/1/enkamp, 391 F.Supp.2d at 878-79. 
a. Holding Out to Public 
As to whether Guy Carpenter held Itself out to the public as having expertise regarding drafting 
reinsurance agreements and knowingly induced reliance by both General Fire and GF & C on Its 
performance of that function, Guy Carpenter argues that its only relationship was with General Fire as 
General Fire's reinsurance intermediary, not with GF & C, the holding company, and that GF & C 
cannot present any evidence that Guy Carpenter "knowingly induced" GF & C to rely on any action or 
representation. Guy Carpenter's Memorandum in Support, pp. 13, 17 (Docket No. 37, Att. 1). 
Guy Carpenter relies heavily on Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 895 
P.2d 1195 (1995). See Guy Carpenter's Memorandum in Support, pp. 16-18 (Docket No. 37, Att. 1). 
In Duffin, the plaintiff had purchased seed potatoes that had been "certified" to be free of disease by 
both the Idaho Crop Improvement Association ("!CIA'') and by Idaho's Federal-State Inspection 
Service. Id. at 1005, 895 P.2d at 1198. The seed, after being planted by the plaintiffs, turned out to 
be infected with bacterial ring rot. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held the !CIA and the plaintiff were in 
a "special relationship," recognizing that the ICIA had "engaged in a marketing.campaign, for the 
benefit of its members, the very purpose of which is to Induce reliance by purchasers on the fact that 
seed ha[d] been certified." Id. at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court held that 
the !CIA "occupies a special relationship with those whose reliance it has knowingly induced." Id. 
In this case, Guy Carpenter's marketing material states that "[e]ffectlve reinsurance may add 
tangible value to an insurance enterprise, 0 Exhibit 1 to Stanger Affidavit, p. 5 (Docket No. 36, Att. 
11). Based on that and due to GF & C and General Fire's close relationship, a reasonable jury could 
conclude that Guy Carpenter engaged in a marketing campaign to induce reliance not only by the 
direct purchasers of the reinsurance, but also by those within an "insurance enterprise." 
b. Professional Performs Personal Services 
*6 As to whether Guy Carpenter provided personal services to GF & C so as to create a special 
relationship, Guy Carpenter presented the affldavi~s of several former, high-level employees of GF & 
C and General Fire, who state that GF & C never had any kind of a relationship with Guy Carpenter. 
Bonneau Declaration, ,i,i 2, 5 (Docket No. 37, Att,' 5) ("I was employed by General Fire & Casualty 
Co. from December 2001 until March 2005, including acting as Director of Claims, Vice President of 
Claims, and Senior Vice President, serving alongside Barbara Anderson and Dan Crandall as a 
member of General Fire's reinsurance committee.'') ("GF & c Holding Company had no relationship at 
all with Guy Carpenter.); Anderson Declaration, ,i,i 2, 5 (Docket No. 37, Att. 6) ("I was employed by 
General Fire & Casualty Co., including positions as the Chief Financial Officer, Chief Information 
Officer, Chief Operations Officer, Vice President for Actuarial and Statistics, and Executive Vice 
President, from General Fire's inception in 1998 until leaving the company in June 2005.'') ("GF & C 
Holding Company had no relationship with Guy Carpenter. Guy Carpenter acted as a reinsurance 
Intermediary only for General Fire. To my knowledge, Guy Carpenter has never performed any 
services for GF & C."); Winston Declaration, ,i,i 2, 5 (Docket No. 37, Att. 7) ("I was employed by 
General Fire & Casualty Co. as its Chief Underwriting Officer from General Fire's inception in 1998 
until January 2003. Throughout this time, I was closely involved in the development and 
Implementation of General Fire's reinsurance program.'') ("Guy Carpenter had no relationship with GF 
& C Holding Co. Guy Carpenter's client was General Fire only, and Guy Carpenter never performed 
any services for GF & C to my knowledge.''). 
On the other hand, GF & C also presented a substantial amount of evidence In support of Its 
contention that Guy Carpenter performed services on Its behalf. For example, there is evidence to 
support the following conclusions: 
1) GF & C and General Fire 
at all times understood and believed that Guy Carpenter's services were being provided to and for 
the benefit of the entire insurance enterprise, including both GF & C and Gen Fire, and that GF & C 
could and did reasonably rely on Guy Carpenter's representations and the proper performance of Guy 
Carpenter's services, including those representations concerning reinstatement premiums and the 
nature of the alleged Hannover Re treaty that form the basis for this litigation. 
Second Crandall Affidavit, ,i 45 (Docket No. 42, Att. 2). 
2) "At all times after July 1, 2000 until late 2003, the personnel with whom Guy Carpenter dealt in 
designing and placing GenFlre's reinsurance programs each year were employees of GF & C Holding 
Company, Including myself, CFO Barbara Anderson, Chief Underwriting Officer Chad Winston and 
Claims Vice President Gary Bonneau.'' Id. at ,i 43; Exhibit 31 to Second Crandall Affidavit, pp, 47-55 
(Docket No. 42, Att. 5) (containing the "Management and Administrative Services Agreement," which 
states that General Fire "agrees to employee and retain" GF & C). 
*7 3) "Mr. Graham[, Senior Vice President of Guy Carpenter,] specifically linked placement of 
GenFire's reinsurance business with Investment in GF & C to foster growth of GenFlre." Second 
Crandall Affidavit, ,i 32 (Docket No. 42, Att. 2). 
4) Guy Carpenter required GF & C's financial statements In order to provide reinsurance to General 
Fire. Id. at ,i 14 ("Guy Carpenter prepared a reinsurance renewal proposal for GenFire which included 
information concerning GF & C Holding Company and its capitalization, as well as GF & C's financial 
statements, because that Information was requested by the reinsurers as part of their determination 
whether to provide reinsurance to GenFlre and terms and conditions thereof.''); see Exhibit 11 to 
Second Crandall Affidavit, pp. 10-23 (Docket No. 42, Att. 3). 
5) In connection with its reinsurance services, Guy Carpenter solicited minority investments in GF 
& C. Second Crandall Affidavit, ,i 37 (Docket No. 42, Att. 2) ("Mr. Graham introduced us to each of 
these reinsurers and, on our behalf, solicited a minority Investment in GF & C by each of these 
reinsurers in connection with a reinsurance placement. n; (emphasis added); see Exhibit 28 to Second 
Crandall Affidavit, pp. 39-42 (Docket No. 42, Att 5). 
6) "In early 2000, Guy Carpenter retained Reinsurance Solutions International, at Guy Carpenter's 
own expense, to assess UOC's reinsurance program and other due diligence information about UOC, 
and provided these results to GF & C as part of Its reinsurance intermediary services." Second 
Crandall Affidavit, ,i 27 (Docket No. 42, Att. 2) (emphasis added). 
From all of this evidence, for purposes of the pending motion for summary judgment, a rational 
trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Guy Carpenter provided professional services to GF & C, 
as well as to General Fire, Including services encompassing reinsurance-Intermediary services. To 
conclude otherwise, the Court would have to weigh evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses, 
which would be inappropriate in addressing a moti'on for summary judgment. More specifically, from 
the evidence referenced above on both sides of the factual issue, a rational trier of fact could 
reasonably conclude that Guy Carpenter solicited and participated in investment transactions for GF & 
C as part of its rendition of reinsurance-intermediary services and that Guy Carpenter was fully aware 
of the close relationship between GF & C and General Fire, such that the improper provision of 
reinsurance-intermediary services would Injure both GF & C and General Fire. With such conclusions 
in mind, It would be equitable to impose a duty on Guy Carpenter to prevent economic loss to GF & c 
as well as to General Fire; see Miflenkamp, 391 F.Supp.2d at 878. Accordingly, a reasonable jury or 
trier of fact could reasonably conclude that GF & C and Guy Carpenter had a special relationship such 
that the economic-loss rule does not apply. 
c. Special Relationships Conclusion 
*8 GF & C has presented a sufficient amount of evidence from which a reasonable jury or trier of 
fact could reasonably conclude either that Guy Carpenter worked directly with both General Fire and 
GF & C, and that it held itself out to insurance enterprises, including holding companies like GF & C, 
as experts in reinsurance intermediary services or that Guy Carpenter provided professional services 
personally to GF & C as well as to General Fire in conjunction with Its reinsurance intermediary 
services. Thus, there exist genuine issues of material fact as to whether GF & C and Guy Carpenter 
were in a special relationship such that the economic-loss rule would not apply. Accordingly, the 
Motion for Summary Judgment Against GF & C's Claims (Docket No. 37) is denied as to the 
negligence claim. 
2. Unique Circumstances 
Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether GF & C and Guy Carpenter were in 
a "special relationship," the Court need not determine whether unique circumstances existed that 
would require a different allocation of risk between the parties. See Millenkama_, 391 F.Supp.2d at 
879. 
C. GF & C's Other Claims 
As to GF & C's other claims, i.e., breach of fiduciary duty (count three); breach of contract (count 
four); misrepresentation (count five); constructive fraud (count six); and forfeiture, disgorgement, 
and/or constructive trust (count seven), Guy Carpenter argues that "[t]he lack of any relationship 
between Guy Carpenter and GF & C precludes all of GF & C's claims" particularly because the lack of a 
relationship precludes the presence of any duty owed by Guy Carpenter to GF & C. Guy Carpenter's 
Memorandum in Support, pp. 21-23 (Docket No. 37, Att. 1). 
In regard to a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is on the moving party to show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. See Steck/ v. Motorola, Inc., 7b3 F,2d 392r 393 (9th Cir.1983); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 
u;}. Further, pursuant to District of Idaho Local CM/ Rule 7.l(b), a motion "must be accompanled by 
· a separate brief ... containing all of the reasons and points ahd authorities relied upon by the moving 
party." Dist. Idaho Loe. Civ. R. 7.1(b)(1). 
In moving for summary judgment on GF & C's non-negligence claims, Guy Carpenter relies almost 
exclusively on its contention that no relationship of any kind existed between Guy Carpenter and GF & 
C. However, if genuine issues of material fact exist, or if Guy Carpenter is not entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law, Its motion must be denied In regard to the non-negligence claims. 
As discussed above, based on the evidence presented by GF & C In opposing Guy Carpenter's 
motion on its negligence claim, a reasonable jury or trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Guy 
Carpenter solicited and participated In investment transactions for the benefit of GF & C as part of its 
overal.1 rendition of reinsurance-Intermediary services, and that Guy Carpenter was fully aware of the 
close relationship between GF & C and General Fire, to the extent that the improper provision of 
reinsurance-rntermediary services would injure both GF & C and General Fire. Accordingly, for 
purposes of summary judgment, a reasonable jury or trier of fact could reasonably conclude that it 
would be equitable to impose a duty on Guy Carpenter to prevent a loss to GF & C. Thus, there · 
remain genuine Issues of material fact as to whether Guy Carpenter and GF & Chad a relationship 
and whether, because of that relationship, Guy Carpenter owed duties to GF & C. As such, Guy , 
Carpenterls motion for summary judgment is denied as to GF & C's non-negligence claims. 
D. Conclusion 
*9 There exist genuine issues of material fact as to whether Guy Carpenter and GF & Centered 
into a special relationship sufficient to be included within an exception to the economic-loss rule. 
Further, there remain genuine issues of fact as to whether Guy Carpenter and GF & Chad a 
relationship such that Guy Carpenter owed duties to GF & C. Accordingly, Guy Carpenter's Motion for 
Summary Judgment Against GF & C's Claims (Docket No. 37) is denied. 
IV. 
ORDER 
In accordance with the foregoing reasoning, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Guy Carpenter's Motion 
for Summary JudgmentAgalnst GF & C's Claims (Docket No. 37) is DENIED. 
D.Idaho,2006. 
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
WARREN K. URBOM, Senior District Judge. 
*l Before me Is the motion of Defendant Westfalia-Surge, Inc. to dismiss a portion of the 
plaintiffs complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ( See filing 70.) For the 
following reasons, the defendant's motion will be denied. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On December 12, 2001, the plaintiff, Hallmage Farms, L.L.C., filed a three-count complaint against 
the defendant, Westfalia-Surge, Inc., alleging caui;es of action based upon "Breaches of Express 
Warranties," (Count I), "Breach of Implied Warranty," (Count II), and "Negligence," (Count III). ( See 
generally Comp!. and Jury Demand (hereinafter "Comp!."), filing 1.) According to the complaint, the 
plaintiff, which is a "commercial dairy engaged In the production of milk and fluid dairy products for 
profit," ( id. ,i 5), negotiated with the defendant to purchase "plans, specifications, goods, materials 
and services for the erection of a rotary dairy parlor, milking platform, and machine," ( id. ,i 9). These 
purchases apparently led to the construction of a structure that formed part of a "new dairy · 
operation." ( Id. ,i 9.) However, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's breaches of various 
warranties and negligence have caused the plaintiff to suffer damages. ( See generally id.) 
On March 25, 2003, the defendant filed a "Motion for Partial Dismissal," filing 70, wherein it argues 
that the plaintiffs third claim must be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 
In support of its motion to dismiss, the defendant has filed an index of evidence containing a brief 
excerpt from the report of Michael Behr, Ph.D. ( See Index of Evidence, filing 71.) The plaintiff has 
filed a brief In opposition to the defendant's motion. ( See Pl. 's Br. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Partial 
Dismissal (hereinafter "Pl.'s Br."), filing 89,) My analysis of the parties' arguments follows. 
II. STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). "a motion to dismiss a complaint should not 
be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would 
entitle him to relief." Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185. 187 (8th Cir.1986) (citation omitted); see also 
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). In resolving such motions, all well-pleaded 
allegations In the complaint must be taken as tru~, and the complaint and all reasonable Inferences 
arising therefrom must be weighed in favor of the plaintiff. Morton. 793 F.2d at 187. When 
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court has the discretion to decide whether It will 
accept materials outside the pleadings. See Skvberq v. United Food and Commercial Workers 
International Union. 5 F.3d 297. 302 n. 2 (8th Cir.1993). If the court accepts such materials, it must 
treat the motion to dismiss as if it were a motion for summary judgment brought pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b). 
III. ANALYSIS 
*2 The defendant argues that the plaintiff's negligence claim must be dismissed because all of the 
plaintiff's claimed losses are "economic losses," and Nebraska law prohibits "recovery for economic 
loss alone in a product liability action based upon tort." (Mot. for Partial Dismissal, f!ling 70, at 1 
(citing Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., Inc., 209 N.W.2d 643 (Neb.1973) and Neb.Rev.Stat. § 
25-21, 180).) Preliminarily, I note that In its atterr,ipt to establish that the plaintiff's claimed losses are 
all solely "economic losses," the defendant has submitted a portion of the report of Michael Behr, 
Ph.D., an economist who analyzed "1he EconomiciLoss to Halimage Dairy Due to Malfunctioning 
Milking Equipment." ( See Mot. for Partial Dismissal, filing 70, at 1 (citing "the report of plaintiff's 
damages expert"); Index of Evidence, filing 71, "Item 1" at MB 000090.) It seems to me that this 
exhibit amounts to "written ... evidence ... In opposition to the pleading that provides some 
substantiation for and does not merely reiterate what Is said In the pleadings," and therefore 
constitutes a "matter[ ] outside the pleading" within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 
.(Q)_. Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals, Inc .• 187 F.3d 941. 948 (8th Cir.1999) (quoting 
Gibb v. Scott. 958 F.2d 814,816 (8th Cir.1992) and FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)). Therefore, If I were to 
accept the defendant's evidence, I would then be required to treat the defendant's motion as one for 
summary judgment. See FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b). See also Hamm, 187 F.3d at 948-49. However, it 
appears that the defendant's motion, which was filed on March 25, 2003, would be untimely if it were 
treated as a motion for summary judgment. ( See Order Setting Schedule for Progression of Case, 
filing 14 (setting deadline for filing of motions for summary judgment at thirty days prior to the date 
set for completion of depositions); Order, filing 37 ("The deposition deadline is continued to March 14, 
2003 and other deadlines which use the deposition deadline as a point of reference are extended 
accordingly.").) 
Furthermore, even if the defendant's motion were not untimely (or if I chose not to accept the 
defendant's evidence, and thereby declined to convert the defendant's motion into one for summary 
judgment), the motion would fail on Its merits. In support of its motion, the defendant relies upon 
Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., Inc .. 209 N.W.2d 643 (Neb.1973) for the proposition that, in 
cases where a party's losses are strictly "economic," that party may not recover damages under the 
law of torts. However, the Supreme Court of Nebr'eska has stated, 
; 
To the extent that Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., Inc., 190 Neb. 546. 209 N.W.2d 643 
(1973), held that strict liability in tort may not be used to recover for physical harm to property only, 
it is disapproved. To hold otherwise would penalize the fortunate persons who escape personal injury 
and ignore the specific language of§ 402 A of the Restatement and a virtually unbroken line of 
decisions of other courts. 
*3 National Crane Corporation v. Ohio Steel Tube Company, 332 N.W .2d 39, 43-44 (Neb.1983). 
In National Crane, the plaintiff, a manufacturer of cranes, purchased steel tubing from the defendant 
and incorporated this tubing into Its cranes. See id. at 41. However, after the portions of the cranes 
that contained the defendant's steel tubing failed repeatedly, the plaintiff initiated a retrofit program 
to replace that tubing in all of Its cranes. See Id. at 41-42. The plaintiff then filed a petition to recover 
the costs associated with the retrofit program. See id. at 41. The plaintiff's first cause of action was 
based upon a breach of express and implied warranties, the second was based upon negligent 
manufacture, and the third was based upon strict liability. See id. at 42. The plaintiff's petition was 
eventually dismissed in its entirety; specifically, the first cause of action was deemed barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations, while the second and third causes of action were found to be "not 
available for the recovery of economic loss." Id. The plaintiff appealed, arguing "that the principles of 
tort law should be extended to permit plaintiff to recover the economic losses Incurred under the 
retrofit program involved here, and that plaintiff should not be limited to recovery on the contractual 
basis of express or implied warranties." Id. The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's 
petition, stating, "We hold that the purchaser of a product pursuant to contract cannot recover 
economic losses from the seller manufacturer on claims in tort based on negligent manufacture or 
strict flab!lity in the absence of physical harm to persons or property caused by the defective 
product." Id. at 44 (emphasis added). Since the damages sought by the plaintiff were only the costs 
assoclated with the replacement of the defective tubing, the court concluded that these damages did 
not result "from physical harm caused by the defective product," but "[i]nstead ... are damages 
resulting from the purchase of defective or unsatisfactory products." Id. 
In the present case, the plaintiff Is not seeking to recover the costs associated with the 
replacement of the allegedly defective products and services provided by the defendant. ( See Compl. 
,i 28.) Instead, the plaintiff seeks damages to remedy the physical harm caused by these allegedly 
defective products or services. ( See id.) Thus, it seems to me that the plaintiffs negligence claim is 
not barred under Nebraska law. See Natlona!Crane Corporation v. Ohio Steel Tube Company, 332 
fj, W.2d 39, 43-44 (Neb.1983). 
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant's Motion for Partial Dismissal, filing 70, is denied. 
D.Neb.,2003. 
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
JOHN EDWARDS CONWAY, Senior District Judge. 
*l THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Rota-Tech's Motion for Partial summary 
Judgment, filed October 1, 2004 ( Doc.94 ). The Court, having considered the Motion, the parties' 
submissions, and the relevant authority, denies the motion in part and grants it in part ENl. 
FNl. In a Pre-Trial Conference held on April 5, 2005, the Court made oral rulings on two 
of the three dispositive motions pending before it. The Court also instructed that written 
memoranda and orders would follow. To the extent that this Memorandum Opinion and 
Order diverges from any oral rulings, such oral rulings are vacated and superseded by 
this written Memorandum. 
I. Background 
This case arises from alleged deficiencies in a milking system installed at a commercial dairy 
located in New Mexico. In January 2000, Plaintiff and Rota-Tech entered into a Construction 
Agreement, though the document was never signed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rota-
Tech designed, manufactured, installed and serviced commercial dairy milking equipment as part of 
the system that failed to perform as intended resulting in financial loss. Plaintiff brings claims 
sounding in both contract and tort. 
II. Legal Standard 
A party is entitled to summary judgment on all or any part of a claim as to which there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and as to which the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). For purposes of a 
summary judgment motion, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party. Id. The moving party has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine Issue of 
material fact. Id. at 256. The movant may discharge this burden by pointing out the absence of 
evidence to support one or more essential elements of the non-moving party's claim, as "a complete 
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all 
other facts immaterial."Ce/otex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317. 323-25 (1986). 
Once the moving party has carried its burden ~nder Rule 56(c), the non-moving party must do 
more than merely show that there Is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita 
E/ec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The party opposing the 
motion may not rest on mere allegations or denials of pleading, but must set forth specific facts 
showing a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 256, To meet this burden, the 
nonmovant must specify evidence In the record and demonstrate the precise manner In which that 
evidence supports its claims. Gross v. Burggraf, 53 F.3d 1531. 1546 (10th Cir.1995). Unsupported 
allegations, conclusory in nature, are Insufficient to defeat a proper motion for summary judgment. 
Id. If the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving 
party, there Is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597. 
III. Discussion 
Defendant Rota-Tech Dairy Sheds International Ltd. ("Rota-Tech'') moves the Court for summary 
judgment disposition in its favor on Plaintiff's tort claims and further requests a ruling limiting 
Plaintiff's maximum recovery to the price of the milking platform as stated in the Construction 
Agreement ("Agreement") between Plaintiff and Rota-Tech.EN2 In support of its Motion, Rota-Tech 
asserts, and Plaintiff denies, that Rota-Tech and Plaintiff are parties to a written contract for the sale 
of goods governed by New Mexico's Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"). Next, Rota-Tech asserts the 
undisputed fact that the damages allegedly suffered by Plaintiff are comprised of purely economic 
losses. Thus, Rota-Tech urges, Plaintiff's claims sounding In negligence and strict products liability are 
barred by the economic loss rule, which prohibits recovery in tort for purely economic losses In 
commercial settings. Further, Rota-Tech argues, t.he Agreement expressly precludes any recovery for 
incidental and consequential damages through its 'Limitation of Liability Clauses and caps the available 
recovery at $212,053.00, the purchase price of the rotary platform Rota-Tech sold to Mariposa Farms. 
FN2. Rota-Tech also requested summary judgment In Its favor on Plaintiff's claim for 
punitive damages. That Issue was mooted, however, upon filing of the parties' Stipulation 
for Dismissal of Punitive Damages Claim on F'ebruary 22, 2005 ( Doc.195 ). 
*2 Plaintiff responds that the economic loss rule does not apply, for in New Mexico its preclusive 
effect is limited to claims for Injuries to the product itself absent special circumstances not present 
here. The property damages Plaintiff suffered are to Its herd of milking cows, not the milking 
machinery that was the subject of the Its contract with Rota-Tech. Plaintiff also. asserts that its 
relationship to Rota-Tech exceeded the mere sale of goods and thus the transaction is not governed 
exclusively by the UCC. In this vein, Plaintiff contends that Rota-Tech was the "principal designer of 
the platform, various components of the vacuum system, and the manner in which the equipment 
would integrate with Westfalia-Surge equipment." Resp. at 1-2. Finally, Plaintiff contends that the 
Limitation of Liability clauses in the contract relied upon by Rota-Tech to limit damages fail of their 
essential purpose and /;Ire unconscionable, for the defects in the equipment were latent and damages 
in excess of the contract price were already Incurred by the time such defects were discovered. 
Plaintiff also challenges enforcement of the Limitation of Liability clauses arguing no mutual assent to 
those terms. 
A. Economic Loss Rufe , 
It ls well-settled in New Mexico that the economic loss rule precludes tort claims for "economic 
losses from injury of a product to Itself." In re Consolidated Vista Hills Retaining Waff Litig., Amrep. 
Southwest, Inc. v. Shoffenbarger, 119 N.M. 542 (1995) (quoting Utah Int'/, Inc; v. Caterpilfar Tractor 
Co., 108 N.M. 539 (Ct.App.1989)). Indeed, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that In commercial 
transactions between parties with comparable bargaining power, damage to the product itself 
should be governed by contract law. Caterpillar, 108 N.M. at 542. The perplexing question here is 
whether the instant case presents the type of circumstances exhibited in SQectron Dev. Lab. v. Am. 
Hollow Boring Co., 123 N.M. 170 (Ct.App.1997) which would provide a rationale for applying the 
economic loss rule to the property damages allegedly suffered by Plaintiff. Rota-Tech asserts that the 
holding In Spectron Is not limited to its unusual facts and is determinative. The Court, after much 
deliberation, disagrees with Rota-Tech's position on the state of the law and, for the reasons 
discussed briefly below, finds the underlying Spectron rationale lacking on the facts of this case. 
Rota-Tech asserts that Plaintiff "seeks to turn Spectron on Its head by arguing that tort remedies 
are available for property damage In commercial transactions unless a plaintiff possesses 
extraordinary sophistication regarding the product." Reply at 10. Rota-Tech instead reads Spectron as 
creating the opposite presumption, that "for the courts to interfere with the statutory scheme by 
superimposing tort rules, there must be sound po\lcy reasons for finding the statutory scheme to be 
inadequate." Reply at 10 (quoting Spectron, 123 N.M. at 176). While this is true, the policy reasons 
supporting strict products liability were also discussed by the Spectron court and, at least to some 
extent, recognized to bear even on the "special situation" before it. Id . 
*3 The Spectron court clearly stated that the "key feature" of the relationship between buyer and 
seller of the steel pump tube Incorporated into a sophisticated light-gas gun in that case was that 
"[buyer] Titan was essentially the manufacturer of the [end product] light-gas gun, acting as the 
designer and general contractor who subcontra.cted out the production and assembly of component 
parts.'' Id. at 176. Moreover, the court noted that Titan was, in fact, the only company in the United 
States designing, manufacturing, and producing the highly sophisticated light-gas gun at that time, 
essentially characterizing Titan as the foremost authority on the end product itself. Id. 
By contrast, the evidence before the Court indicates no similar, exclusive expertise on the part of 
Mariposa regarding the milking platform and system, notwithstanding Mr. Skelley functioning as 
general contractor for the start-up dairy project and his prior experience at another diary. Mr. Skelley 
stated that he had no knowledge, skill, or prior experience with Rota-Tech's Rotary Platform. Skelley 
Aff. at 2-3. Nor can Plaintiff be accurately described as the designer and manufacturer of the milking 
system, much less the only such manufacturer. Instead, Rota-Tech's Director, John Bowers, prepared 
all of the specifications for the milking system. Bowers Dep. at 15:9-12. Though Skelley undisputedly 
reviewed the specifications and had some Input regarding modifications thereto, the Court finds 
Skelley's posture vis-a-vis Rota-Tech to be distinguishably different than that of the Spectron buyer to 
Its seller. 
The Court recognizes that the Spectron holding was not based solely upon the buyer's exceptional 
and superior expertise, though reiterates that It was "key.'' The Court of Appeals cited the economic 
loss rule; considered the highly remarkable knowledge and expertise on the part of the buyer; 
analyzed the four primary policy factors supporting strict liability; found that the UCC provided 
adequate response to those factors Insofar as they applied to the "special situation" before it, and 
concluded that contract remedies alone were adequate on the facts of that case. Spectron, 123 N.M. 
at 175-177. In reachlng its determination, the Spectron court quoted from Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 127 Cal.Rptr. 838, 845, but ultimately declined to dei:ide "precisely when 
the UCC is the exclusive source of remedies for property damage ... "and limited its reliance on the 
Kaiser rule to reinforcing "the result we reach today.'' Id. at 177 (emphasis added). 
The Court is mindful of the Michigan Supreme Court's ruling in the consolidated cases styled 
Neibarger v. Universal Cooperatives, Inc,, 486 N.W.2d 612 (Mich.1992). which cases present facts 
remarkably similar to those at hand. As Rota-Tech reminds the Court, however, "the Court's primary 
concern in this diversity case [is] to apply New Mexico law as New Mexico would apply it.'' Reply at 
16. In that very quest, the Court determines that even if the Spectron decision extended the doctrine 
of economic loss to other property damage as a presumption that may be rebutted by other policy 
considerations, it Is simply not convinced that New Mexico courts would apply the limitation on the 
facts of this case. It bears repeating that the policies supporting strict products liability were 
determined to be adequately "addressed" by the UCC only in Spectron's "special situation." Id. At 
176. 
*4 That said, it is with some consternation that the Court declines to endorse Rota-Tech's more 
broad reading of the economic loss rule to preclude Plaintiff's strict llability and negligence claims 
under Spectron. However, the Court finds no unique circumstances present under which the UCC 
remedies adequately address the policies supporting strict liability here as they did in Spectron. Thus, 
the economic loss rule should not bar Plaintiff's tort law claims. 
B. Sale of Goods 
Given a mixed contract including sale of goods and services, the "primary purpose" test must be 
applied to determine whether the contract Is governed by the UCC. Thus, the question is whether the 
Agreement was primarily for the sale of the equipment, Involving incidental services such as 
Installation and maintenance, or primarily for the rendition of those services, with the transfer of the 
equipment incidental to that purpose. See Kirkpatrick v. Introspect Healthcare Corp., 114 N.M. 706. 
709-710 (1992) (applying test established In Bonebreak v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir.1974). On the 
record before it, the Court determines as a matter of law that the Agreement's primary purpose was 
the sale of the goods, chiefly the milking carousel; the design, installation and service related thereto 
were secondary to that purpose. Thus, to the extent that the Agreement was In force, it is governed 
by the UCC. · 
C. Limitation Clauses 
Rota-Tech seeks summary judgment determination that the Limitation of Liability clauses in the 
Construction Agreement are valid and enforceable as a matter of law. Plaintiff responds that the 
Limitation clauses are either unconscionable or fail in their essential purpose and, as such, are invalid. 
Plaintiff further argues that it never signed the Agreement and, despite testifying to its belief that it 
indeed had an agreement with Rota-Tech for design, construction, and installation of the platform, It 
never manifested assent to the terms of the Limited Liability clauses. 
Lack of Signature by Plaintiff 
First, the Court will discuss due execution of the Agreement. Plaintiff never signed the Agreement, 
but through Skelley's testimony it has acknowledged its belief that it had an agreement with Rota-
Tech for the design, construction, and installation ·of the rotary platform. Skelley Dep. at 170: 17. 
Plaintiff also asserts, however, notwithstanding its acknowledgment through its 30(b)(c) witness 
Skelley that an agreement existed, it did not assent to the Limited Liability terms of the Agreement 
Defendants seek to enforce against It. Further, Plaintiff argues, Rota-Tech did not itself sign the 
Agreement until January 2000 but had begun design of the parlor in July 1999. Because the design 
portion of the relationship preceded the Construction Agreement by five months, Plaintiff argues, It 
cannot be said that the design features were performed under the written Agreement limiting liability 
or that the Agreement embodied the complete relationship between the parties. 
*5 Rota-Tech contends that whether the contract was duly executed despite the lack of signature 
by Marisposa is a question of law for the Court to determine on summary judgment. On this point, 
Rota-Tech references NMSA 1978 § 55-2-201(3)(b) providing that execution Is unnecessary to satisfy 
the UCC statute of frauds when a party admits the existence of the contract In pleadings and 
testimony. Resp. at 6, n. 2. The Court finds, nonetheless, lingering questions of material fact making 
summary judgment disposition improper, for the real dispute Is regarding the terms of the agreement 
and mutual assent thereto. Plaintiff contends that it had an agreement but denies that the Agreement 
before the Court embodies it. Absent a determination of mutual assent, a question of fact, the Court 
cannot rule that the Agreement was duly executed as a matter of law. Therefore, summary judgment 
on this issue is denied. 
Essential Purpose/Unconscionability 
If the evidence at trial establishes that there was due execution of the Agreement, Plaintiff's 
challenges to enforceability of the Limitation clauses on other grounds remain in need of resolution. 
Rota-Tech, never Plaintiff, Identifies for the Court the three different clauses in question and provides 
· the proper standard for analyzing the challenges to each. The clauses at issue are (1) a clause 
excluding all consequential damages; (2) a clause excluding consequential damages related to death 
or injury to Plaintiff's animals; and (3) a clause limiting Rota-Tech's maximum liability to Plaintiff to 
an amount no greater than the purchase price of the Rotary Platform. Reply at 16 (citing Agreement 
,i,i 7.1, 7.l(c), 7.2). The first two clauses exclude;consequential damages while the third is a limited 
remedy provision. Section 55-2-302 of the New Mexico UCC makes all contract clauses subject to 
unconscionability analysis while Section 55-2-719 provides that limited remedies are unenforceable if 
they fail of their essential purpose. 
Whether the limitation of remedies clause fails of Its essential purpose involves questions of fact. 
Plaintiff urges that it fails in purpose because the alleged defects in the equipment were latent and 
went undiscovered until significant damage was done. The question whether latent defects existed Is 
clearly one of material fact. Plaintiff further asserts that enforcement of the limited remedy provision 
would deprive It of the substantial benefit of its bargain. Defendant argues that the latent defect 
theory upon which Plaintiff so heavily relies is, without more, insufficient to defeat a motion for 
summary judgment. The Court finds, however, that factual development at trial Is necessary on this 
issue as well. Thus, summary judgment disposition is improper. 
Similarly, whether any of the three clauses are unenforceable against Plaintiff as unconscionable 
requires factual development at trial. Indeed, Rota-Tech correctly identifies that under the UCC, 
unconscionability is an "absence of meaningful choice" for one party combined with "contract terms 
which are unreasonably favorable to the other party." See Bow/in's, Inc. v. Ramsey Oil Co., Inc., 99 
N.M. 660. 668 (Ct.App.1983) (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 
{Q.C,_Cir.1965)). Rota-Tech then swiftly asserts that the Court should determine the unconscionabillty 
questions as a matter of law at this summary judgment phase. The Court finds that factual 
development is necessary, however, before a reasoned and informed determination can be made on 
this issue. Thus, summary judgment on this issue:of unconscionability will be denied. 
IV. Conclusion 
*6 In summary, the Court determines as a matter of law that the economic loss rule should not 
preclude Plaintiff from seeking recovery in both contract and tort on the facts of this case. The Court 
further finds the record before it sufficient for the Court to determine, as a matter of law, that the 
primary purpose of the Agreement was the sale of goods and as such It is governed by the UCC. The 
Court denies summary judgment on the issues of due execution and enforceablity of the Limitation of 
Remedies clauses against Plaintiff, finding genuine issues of material fact In need of resolution at trial. 
WHEREFORE, 
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Rota-Tech 's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed October 
1, 2004 ( Doc.94) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: 
I. The economic loss rule does not preclude Plaintiff's tort claims; 
II. The written Agreement is governed by the ucc; and 
III. Due execution of the Agreement, and enforceability of the Limitation of Remedies 
clauses against Plaintiff involve questions of fact in need of resolution at trial. 
D.N.M.,2005. 
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Motions. Pleadings and Filings 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, 
D. Maryland. 
PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY, As subrogee of Antoine and Emily van Agtmael, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Clay H. WHALEY, individually d/b/a C.H. Whaley & Son, Inc., Defendant. 
Clay H. Whaley, individually d/b/a C.H. Whaley & Son, Inc., Third-Party Plaintiff 
v. 
Compton & Sons, Third-Party Defendant. 
Civil No. JFM 07-826, 
Aug. 25, 2008. 
Background: Property Insurer, as subrogee of Its insured, brought suit against home contractor for 
negligence, breach of contract, and breach of warranty in removing and replacing roof on insured's 
residence. Contractor filed third party claim against subcontractor for contribution and indemnity. The 
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, 560 F.Supp.2d 425. denied subcontractor's 
motion for summary judgment on third-party claim. Subcontractor moved for reconsideration. 
Holdings: The District Court, Motz, J., held that: 
ill economic Joss doctrine did not preclude claim against roofing subcontractor for damages to house 
and Its contents, and 
ill possibility under allegations of complaint that general contractor's negligence was passive 
permitted third-party Indemnification claim. 
Motion denied. 
w Ii KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote 
c--,313A Products Liability 
Economic loss doctrine prohibits a plaintiff from recovering in tort for purely economic losses, on 
other words, losses that involve neither a clear danger of physical Injury or death, nor damage to 
property other than the product itself. 
[2l Ii KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote 
.:=313A Products Liability \ 
Under Maryland law, while recovery in tort Is not permitted for damage to the defective Item Itself, 
recovery in tort is permitted for damage to items added to or used in conjunction with a defective 
item. 
ru II KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote 
~379 Torts 
Under Maryland law, the economic loss doctrine did not shield roofing subcontractor who installed 
new roof on existing structure from tort liability for damages to the house and its contents, with the 
exception of the roof itself. 
~ Ii KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote 
·!)o;.>208 Indemnity . 
Under Maryland law, If the conduct attributed fo the party seeking Indemnification in the original 
plaintiffs complaint constitutes active negligence, !or if it is clear from the complaint that this party's 
liability would only arise from proof of active negligence, then there is no valid claim for Indemnity. 
m \i KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote 
·\?208 Indemnity 
Under Maryland law, general contractor could pursue third-party indemnification claim against 
roofing subcontractor, where possibility existed under allegations of homeowners' complaint, charging 
that damage to their home was caused by negligence of general contractor "and/or" its subcontractor, 
that general contractor could be held Jlable for negligence that was solely passive. 
Thomas M. Wood, IV, Neuberger Quinn Gielen Rubin and Gibber PA, Baltimore, MD, Sean P. 
O'Donnell, Cozen and O'Connor, Philadelphia, PA, for Pacific Indemnity Company. 
Robert Leigh Hebb, Eric Michael Leppo, Semmes Bowen and Semmes PC, Baltimore, MD, for Clay H. 
Whaley. 
Betty Sue Diener, Marks ONeill OBrien and Courtney PC, Towson, MD, for Compton & Sons. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
J. FREDERICK MOTZ, District Judge. 
*l In a Memorandum Opinion I issued on June 16, 2008, I denied third-party defendant Compton 
& Sons' motion for summary judgment. Pac. Indem. Co. v. Whaley, No. 07-CV-826, 2008 WL · 
2440711. at *1 (D. Md. June 16, 2008). Compton & Sons ("Compton") has moved for me to 
reconsider two of my conclusions: (1) that the economic loss doctrine does not shield Compton from 
tort liability; and (2) that third-party plaintiff Whaley's indemnification claim must survive summary 
judgment because plaintiff Pacific Indemnity Company's complaint did not specifically allege that 
Whaley was actively negligent, FNl (Compton Mem. at 2-4). For the reasons that follow, I will deny 
Compton's motion for reconsideration. 
I. 
U1 \i The economic loss doctrine "prohibits a plaintiff from recovering In tort for purely economic 
losses-losses that involve neither a clear danger of physical injury or death, nor damage to property 
other than the product Itself." Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 340 Md. 519, 667 A.2d 624, 630 
(Md.1995). The Maryland Court of Appeals has further explained that "[e]conomic losses include such 
things as the loss of value or use of the product itself, the cost to repair or replace the product, or the 
lost profits resulting from the loss of use of the product." FN2 A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse 
{:/ectric Corp .. 333 Md. 245, 634 A.2d 1330. 1332 (Md.1994). 
In my June 16 Memorandum Opinion, I conclu~ed that the "product" that Compton was providing 
was the replacement of the van Agtmaels' roof, and thus that the economic loss doctrine does not 
shield Compton from tort llablllty because the physical damage in the instant case was to property 
other than the roof under construction. Pac. Indem. Co., 2008 WL 2440711. at *4 n. 6, Compton 
argues that I erred in reaching this conclusion, contending that the "product" was the van Agtmaels' 
entire house,·and thus that "all of the damages in the [instant] case are economic loss damages, 
including but not limited to the roof, the walls, the ceilings, the floors, the utilities, and the 
contents." (Compton's Mot. for Recons. at 1.) 
A. 
The majority of the Maryland cases that have addressed the economic loss doctrine are not helpful 
in resolving Whether the damages In the instant case constitute property damage or economic loss, 
because in those cases there clearly had been no property damage.FN3 In Decoster, however, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals did address whether the damages sought constituted property damage or 
economic loss. Decoster, 634 A.2d at 1333. The plaintiff, a commercial chicken and egg producer, had 
suffered loss of more than 140,000 chickens as a result of a power failure that interrupted the power 
supply to the ventilation system in plaintiff's chicken houses. Id. at 1331. Plaintiff filed suit against 
the manufacturer of the allegedly defective transfer switch, which had failed to activate the 
emergency backup power system. Id. The court explained that "[u]nder Whiting Turner, Decoster's 
ability to pursue an action in tort against Westinghouse for the loss of its chickens turns upon whether 
its damages are considered physical harm or economic losses and, if the latter, whether the defective 
switch caused a dangerous condition creating a risk of death or personal injury to humans." Id. at 
1333. The court concluded that it 
*2 need not reach the second part of this determination, because the death of the chickens is a loss 
of physical property, rather than economic loss. Decoster does not seek to recover for the loss of 
value of the switch, or Its replacement or repair costs. Nor does it seek recovery of lost profits from 
its diminished egg production. These are all economic losses. Instead, Decoster seeks only the 
replacement of property that was damaged by the alleged defectiveness of the product 
manufactured by Westinghouse. 
Id. 
121 I' Similarly, in National Coach Works of Virginia v. Detroit Diesel Corp .• 128 F.Supp.2d 821. 
831 m.Md.2001}, Judge Blake of this court held that, under Maryland law, the purchaser of a bus 
could recover In tort from the manufacturer of the bus engine for damage to the bus after the bus's 
engine caught fire and destroyed the bus. The court held that although the economic loss doctrine 
barred recovery for the engine itself because it w9s the "defective product," Maryland law "plainly 
permit[ted]" recovery for "other property" damaged by the engine, including the bus. Id. The court 
. ' relied on the Maryland Court of Appeals' holding iii Decoster, and the fact that the United States 
Supreme Court, in Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co .• 520 U.S. 875, 880, 117 S.Ct. 1783. 
138 L.Ed.2d 76 (1997}, had cited Decoster for the principle that while recovery in tort is not 
permitted for damage to the defective item Itself, recovery in tort is permitted for damage to "items 
added to or used in conjunction with a defective item .... " .EM Id. · 
B. 
As Compton correctly points out, the above Maryland case law does not directly address whether a 
house and its contents are considered "other property" for purposes of determining whether an 
allegedly negligent roof contractor Is liable in tort for damages to them. (Compton Reply at 11.) For 
this reason, Compton contends that "Maryland law is ripe for a decision that would broaden the scope 
of what would be considered economic loss" by following what Compton submits Is the "modern 
trend" In economic loss doctrine jurisprudence: precluding tort liability where damage to "other 
property" was "foreseeable" or where the damaged "other property" was "part of an integrated 
system." (Compton Reply at 3; Compton Mem. at 5-13.) 
In support of the "foreseeability" approach, Compton cites the Eighth and Sixth Circuits for the rule 
that "tort remedies are unavailable for property damage experienced by the owner where the damage 
was a foreseeable result of a defect at the time the parties contractually determined their respective 
exposure to risk, regardless whether the damage was to the 'goods' themselves or to 'other property.' 
"Dakota Gasification Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys .• 91\F.3d 1094, 1099 (8th Cir.1996); see also Detroit 
Edison Co. v. NABCO. Inc .• 35 F.3d 236 (6th Cir.1994} (applying the economic loss doctrine because 
it was foreseeable to the parties to the contract that pipes conveying high-pressure steam could 
explode, and that such an explosion would damage equipment surrounding the pipes). 
*3 In support of the "integrated system" approach, Compton cites federal district court opinions 
for the rule that "damage by a defective component of an integrated system to either the system as a 
whole or other system components is not damage to 'other property.'" Superior Kitchen Designs, Inc. 
v. Valspar Indus. (U.S.A.), Inc., 263 F.Supp.2d 140, 145 (D.Mass.2003); see also Myrtle Beach 
Pipeline Corp. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 843 F.Supp, 1027, 1057 (D.S.C.1993) ("[If] the other property is 
merely a component part of the overall product Itself[,] ... courts uniformly hold that the economic 
loss doctrine precludes recovery in tort against the manufacturer of the component because the 
component is integrated Into the whole product and the purchaser bargained for the whole product, 
not merely a component of It."), Compton also cites as support the Maryland Court of Special Appeals' 
opinion in Pulte Home Corp. v. Parex, Inc., 174 Md.App. 6$1. 923 A.2d 971, 1004 
(Md.Ct.Spec.App.2007). aff'd, 403 Md. 367, 942 A.2d 722 (Md.2008), In that case, plaintiff 
contended that the allegedly defective synthetic stucco exterior barrier product in the walls of homes 
caused damage not just to Itself but also to the "substrate," to which it was attached, which consisted 
of "sheathing and framing." Pulte, 923 A.2d at 10tl3. The Court of Special Appeals upheld the trial 
court's rejection of plaintiffs argument, agreeing fhat the barrier product was "part of an 'integrated 
whole'-a completed home-when the damage occurred, and the damage was, thus, a 'harm to the 
product itself.' " Id. at 1004. 
I am not persuaded, however, that the Maryland courts would apply the "foreseeability" or the 
"integrated system" approach to the instant case. Other than Pulte, Compton has cited no case in 
which Maryland has adopted either of these approaches. Further, neither approach can be reconciled 
with the. precise distinctions between the "product" and "other property" drawn by the Maryland Court 
of Appeals in Decoster and Judge Blake in National Coach . ENS As for Pulte, the Maryland Court of 
Special Appeals reasonably concluded that in the safe of a new home, the barrier product was part of 
an integrated whole with the "sheathing and framing" of the home. 923 A.2d at 1003-04. In contrast, 
here, Compton's construction work on the van Agtmaels' already existing home was specifically 
limited to the roof, and thus can be far more easily distinguished as the "defective product" from the 
"other property" in the house, including the house's walls, interior cellings, floors, utilities, and 
contents. 
C. 
Compton also cites case law applying the economic loss doctrine in defective roofing scenarios In 
support of Its position. (Compton Reply at 6-8.) Two of the cases Compton cites are clearly 
distinguishable from the instant case. First, in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales 
Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 288-90 (3d Cir.1980), the c~urt held that, under Illinois law, plaintiff steel mill 
could not recover In strict tort liability for a defect(ve roof. However, unlike in the instant case, 
plaintiff sought only economic loss damages "for the failure of the product [the defective roof] to 
perform as it was expected, as distinguished from Injuries to persons or other property caused by a 
defect in the product." Id. at 284. Second, in Citizens Insurance Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 
Inc., 231 Mich.App. 40. 585 N.W.2d 314, 317 (Mich.Ct.App.1998), the court held that the economic 
loss doctrine applied to preclude liability for damages to real and business property as a result of the 
collapse of a defective roof. The court explained: "Unlike some jurisdictions, the economic loss 
doctrine applies in Michigan even when the plaintiff is seeking to recover for property other than the 
product itself.'' Id. at 316. Because Michigan law on this issue stands in direct contrast to Maryland 
law, it is of no help in determining whether the van Agtmaels' house was "other property." 
*4 At first glance, another case cited by Compton, Chicago Heights Venture v. Dynamit Nobel of 
America, Inc., 782 F.2d 723, 729 (7th Cir.1986). provides support for its position. There, the Seventh 
Circuit held that, under Illinois law, defendant was shielded from tort liability for damage to other 
parts of the building caused by the lack of adequate roofing. Relying on Jones & Laughlin, the 
Seventh Circuit recognized that in that case the plaintiff "did not seek damages for any injury to 
property other than the roof itself.'' Id. However, the Seventh Circuit "believe[d]" that this distinction-
that the plaintiff in Jones & Laughlin requested only damages for injury to the product while the 
plaintiff in Chicago Heights Venture requested damages for injury to the other property-would not be 





CEI Industries of Illinois, Inc., 148 III.App.3d 332. 102 Ill.Dec. 1. 499 N.E.2d 558. 563 
(Ill.App.Ct.1986), the Illinois Appeals Court expressly held such a distinction was legally dlsposltlve. 
The court held that, under Illinois law, a warehouse owner could recover in tort for damage to a 
building caused by a defective roof because United "suffer[ed] damages to property other than the 
defective product as a result of the water leakage defect in the roof which caused the sudden and 
violent collapse of its Interior ceiling upon its walls, furniture and furnishings. United has thus made a 
showing of harm above and beyond disappointed expectations." Efill Id. 
· For these reasons, I am not persuaded that any of the case law Compton cites provides guidance 
as to what Is "other property" for purposes of the economic loss doctrine in defective roof scenarios 
under Maryland law.El'l.Z 
D. 
ru \! In light of the Maryland Court of Appeals' decision In Decoster and Judge Blake's decision in 
National Coach, I conclude that, under Maryland law, the economic loss doctrine does not shield 
Compton from tort liability for damages to the van Agtmael's house and its contents, with the 
exception of the roof Itself. Compton was allegedly negligent in replacing the van Agtmaels' roof, and 
thus Is potentially responsible for all damage to "other property" resulting from that negligence, 
Including damage to the house's walls, Interior ceilings, floors, utilities, and contents. As I stated in 
my June 16, 2008 Memorandum Opinion, a subcontractor performing work owes "[a]t least 
reasonable care and precautions .•.. " See Pac. Indem. Co,, 2008 WL 2440711. at *4 n. 6 (quoting 
Klein v. Doughertv, 200 Md. 22. 87 A.2d 821. 825 {Md.1952)). In Klein, the court held that defendant 
subcontractors were liable under tort law for smoke damage caused by their negligent installation of a 
furnace smoke pipe Into a chimney, because "[n]elther of [the subcontractors] exercised such care as 
a qualified person would ordinarily have exercised under the circumstances of this case." Klein. 87 
A.2d at 824·25. For this reason, and the reasons above, I conclude that if Compton is found to have 
been negligent, It Is responsible in tort for damage to property other than the van Agtmaels' roof 
itself. 
II. 
*5 ID IBf rn !Bf As to Whaley·s indemnification claim, Compton argues again that it should be 
dismissed "because Whaley committed active negligence, and the plaintiff's complaint alleges active 
negligence with respect to Whaley." (Compton Mem. at 14.) As I stated in my June 16 Memorandum 
Opinion, neither of these contentions is accurate. Under Maryland law, If the conduct attributed to the 
party seeking indemnification In the original plaintiff's complaint constitutes active negligence, or if it 
is clear from the complaint that this party's liability would only arise from .proof of active negligence, 
then there is no valid claim for indemnity. Kelly v. Fullwood Foods. Inc .• 111 F.Supp.2d 712. 714 
(D.Md.2000). Pacific Indemnity Company's compl~lnt alleges that the damage to the van Agtmaef's 
property "was caused by the negligence ... of defendant Whaley .•• and/or [his] 
subcontractors .... " (Comp! • ,i 18.) The conduct atthbuted to Whaley in the complaint does not 
constitute active negligence because the complaint specifically leaves open the possibility that 
Compton was the actively negligent party. Accordingly, Whaley's liability could arise from proof of 
passive negligence. Further, there is a genuine dispute on the summary judgment record as to 
whether Whaley and/or Compton were negligent, and, if so, whether their negligence was active or 
passive. See Pac. Indem. Co., 2008 WL 2440711. at *5. For these reasons, I held and continue to 
hold that Whaley's indemnification claim must survive summary judgment. Id. 
For the foregoing reasons, I deny Compton's motion for reconsideration. A separate order to that 
effect is being entered herewith. 
FNl. Compton also requests that I reconsider my conclusion that Compton owes a tort 
duty to the van Agtmaels. (Compton Mem. at 3.) In my June 16, 2008 Memorandum 
Opinion, I cited the following language for the Maryland rule that contractual privity is not 
required to establish a tort duty: "'The requirement of privity of contract has been 
abandoned as a basis for recovery by third parties for physical harm to themselves and 
tangible things against those who negligently supply, repair, or construct things so as to 
leave them In an unreasonably dangerous cpndition.'" See Pac. Indem. Co., 2008 WL 
2440711. at *4 n. 6 (quoting Council of Co-'owners Atlantis Condo .• Inc. v. Whiting-
Turner Contracting Co .• 308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 336, 341 (Md.1986)). As Compton 
correctly points out, no unreasonably dangerous condition existed in the Instant case. 
However, I had meant this citation only for purposes of making clear that contractual 
privity is not required to establish a tort duty. I should have also Cited the following 
language from the same case: "In following the modern trend, we hold that prlvlty is not 
an absolute prerequisite to the existence of a tort duty." Whiting-Turner. 517 A.2d at 
343,Under Maryland law, whether a tort duty should be recognized in a particular context 
depends on "two major considerations": (1) "the nature of the harm likely to result from 
a failure to exercise due care," and (2) "the relationship that exists between the parties." 
Jacques v. First Nat'! Bank of Md., 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d756. 759 (Md.1986). "Where 
the failure to exercise due care creates a risk of economic loss only, courts have 
generally required [contractual prlvity or Its equivalent] between the parties as a 
condition to the imposition of tort liability." lil_at 759-60. As I discuss infra, because I 
conclude that Compton's alleged negligence created a risk of (and ultimately resulted in) 
property damage, rather than purely economic loss, I hold that Compton owes a tort duty 
to the van Agtmaels notwithstanding their lack of contractual privity. 
FN2. The Maryland Court of Appeals has explained the rationale behind the economic loss 
doctrine as follows: "A manufacturer may bl! held liable [under tort law] for physical 
injuries, including harm to property, caused' by defects in Its products because It is 
charged with the responsibility to ensure that its products meet a standard of safety 
creating no unreasonable risk of harm." Llovd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 397 Md. 108. 916 
A.2d 257, 265 (Md.2007) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). By contrast, "where the 
loss is purely economic, the manufacturer cannot be charged with the responsibility of 
ensuring that the product meet[s] the particular expectations of the consumer unless it is 
aware of those expectations and has agreed that the product will meet them. Thus, 
generally, the only recovery for a purely economic loss would be under a contract 
theory." Id. (emphasis added). 
FN3, For example, in Whiting-Turner, a condominium owners' association brought suit 
against a general contractor, developer, and architects of their building, alleging that 
defendants had negligently constructed defective vertical utility shafts in the building. 
517 A.2d at 338. Because defendants' alleged negligence had not caused physical harm 
to any person or property, the Maryland Court of Appeals had to determine whether 
defendants had any tort duty to plaintiff based solely on the economic loss of 
reconstructing the utility shafts. Id. at 344-45. Recognizing that the economic loss 
doctrine would normally preclude tort liability, the court carved out an exception from the 
doctrine, concluding that notwithstanding the lack of personal injury or property damage, 
where the "risk generated by the negligent conduct ... is of death or personal injury the 
action wit! lie for recovery of the reasonable; cost of correcting the dangerous condition." 
Id. at 345. Because the court found that the construction defects in the utility shafts 
created a serious risk of injury to residents of the building, it allowed recovery in tort to 
correct those defects.Since Whiting Turner, the Maryland Court of Appeals has in at least 
three other cases grappled with the issue of whether-although the alleged negligence of a 
defendant had not caused personal injury or property damage, but rather only economic 
loss-the risk of injury resulting from the negligence was serious enough to warrant tort 
liability. See U.S. Gypsum v. Mavor & City Council of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 647 A.2d 
405. 410 (Md.1994) (holding that the risk of death or injury caused by asbestos-
containing building materials was serious enough to warrant tort liability); Morris, 667 
A.2d at 633 (holding that the risk of Injury caused by defendant"s alleged negligence in 
manufacturing defective plywood used in building houses was serious enough to warrant 
tort liability); Lloyd, 916 A.2d at 270 (holding that the risk of bodily injury because of the 
alleged negligent manufacturing of defective automobile seats was not serious enough to 
warrant tort liability). 
i 
FN4. In Saratoga, the Supreme Court held that under admiralty law, plaintiff (the second 
user/owner of a fishing vessel) could recover in tort from the manufacturer of the vessel's 
allegedly defective hydraulic system for damages to extra equipment added to the ship 
by the first user/owner of the vessel, because the extra equipment was "other property." 
520 U.S. at 877. The Court stated:State law often distinguishes between Items added to 
or used in conjunction with a defective item purchased from a Manufacturer ( or its 
distributors) and ... permits recovery for the former when physically harmed by a 
dangerously defective product. Thus, the owner of a chicken farm, for example, 
recovered for chickens killed when the chicken house ventilation system failed, 
suffocating the 140,000 chickens Inside. [See Decoster. 634 A.2d at 1330.] 
Id. at 880,634 A.2d 1330. 
FN5. I note that the Third Circuit rejected the "foreseeability" and "integrated system" 
approaches in 2-J Corp. v. Tice, 126 F.3d 539 (3d Clr.1997). In that case, a purchaser of 
a pre-engineered warehouse sued the warehouse's manufacturer for negligence, products 
liability, and breach of contract, alleging that the warehouse collapsed and damaged 
goods stored therein. Id. at 540. The court addressed the issue of "whether property 
becomes a part of the product itself solely because, after the sale to the initial user, It Is 
foreseeably utilized in connection with the owner's use of the product." Id. at 544. The 
court held:[I]t seems apparent to us that lfij:he fishing equipment foreseeably added to 
the ship by the initial user In Saratoga Fishlhq[. 520 U.S. at 880,] did not become a part 
of the 'product itself,' it necessarily follows that the inventory foreseeably stored by the 
initial user In the warehouse here did not become a part of the warehouse itself. 
Accordingly, we believe that the district court's 'integration' theory in this case is 
inconsistent with Saratoga Fishing and that it follows a fortiori from the holding in 
Saratoga Fishing that 2-J can recover for the loss of its inventory and ot.her property 
stored in its warehouse. 
Id. at 544. 
FN6. I recognize that the different decisions in Chicago Heights VentLJre and United Air 
Lines were at least in part a result of the Seventh Circuit's and the Illinois Appeals Court's 
different Interpretations of the Illinois Supreme Court's holding In Redarowicz v. 
Ohlendorf. 92 Ill.2d 171. 65 Ill.Dec. 411. 441 N.E.2d 324 (Ill.1982). While the Seventh 
Circuit understood Redarowicz to preclude liabiJity for damage to other property resulting 
from a latent construction defect, Chicago Heights Venture. 782 F.2d at 729, the Illinois 
Appeals Court understood Redarowicz to preclude liability only for damage to the 
defective product itself, United Air Lines. 102 Ill.Dec. 1. 499 N.E.2d at 562. In any event, 
the conflict between these two cases demonstrates that Illinois law does not provide clear 
guidance on what Is "other property" where: a defective roof has caused damage. 
~ 
', 
FN7. I recognize also that the Maryland Court of Appeals noted in Whiting-Turner that a 
contractor's tort liability "ls In general limited to situations where the conduct of the 
builder causes an accident out of which physical harm occurs to some person or tangible 
thing other than the building itself that is under construction." 517 A.2d at 344 (emphasis 
added). I do not believe, however, that the court's language has any bearing on what is 
\'other property" In defective roof scenarios, because, as discussed supra, plaintiff in 
Whiting-Turner did not allege that there was any damage to property other than the 
product itself. Id. Further, the court discussed the building as a whole because the 
defendants had negligently constructed defective vertical utility shafts in the entire 
building. Id. at 338. In the instant case, by contrast, Compton worked specifically only on 
the van Agtmaels' roof, not.their entire house. 
D.Md.,2008. 
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